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"TO LAY AND COLLECT TAXES":
THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE FOR
PROGRESSIVE TAXATION
By Leo P. Martinezt
We "ain't got no choice."'
John Steinbeck
I. INTRODUCTION
For centuries, people have debated whether the wealthy should pay
more taxes than the poor, and if so, how much more. These issues have
never been resolved, and solutions that will satisfy everyone seem un-
likely to emerge. In this nation, the notion of "progressive" taxation
sparked one of the early battles over tax distribution. Supporters of pro-
gressive taxation favored a graduated tax structure, where the tax rate
would increase with the taxpayer's income.2 Opponents of progressive
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1. JOHN STEINBECK, THE GRAPES OF WRATH 66 (1939). This reference, for which I thank
Bret Birdsong, requires explanation. There is a point in Steinbeck's The Grapes of Wrath in
which Tom Joad and Casy encounter Muley Graves. Tom allows that he is hungry and asks,
"What you gonna eat, Muley? How you been gettin' your dinner?" Muley responds by showing
Tom and Casy two cottontails and a jackrabbit. Casy picks up one of the rabbits and asks, "You
sharin' with us, Muley Graves?" Muley responds, "I ain't got no choice in the matter." Noting
the ungracious sound of his words, Muley continues, "That ain't like I mean it.... [w]hat I mean,
if a fella's got somepin to eat an' another fella's hungry - why, the first fella ain't got no choice."
Id.
In the spirit of Muley Graves, my view is that distributive justice requires progressive taxa-
tion. However, my view is irrelevant to the question of whether the sovereign has the power to
tax progressively.
2. See CAROLYN WEBBER & AARON WILDAVSKY, A HISTORY OF TAXATION AND
EXPENDITURE IN THE WESTERN WORLD 347 (1986) ("Progressive taxation was not a new idea.
From the last quarter of the eighteenth century, minority opinion had favored taxing incomes of
wealthy persons more heavily than those of poorer ones."). See generally ROBERT STANLEY,
DIMENSIONS OF LAW IN THE SERVICE OF ORDER: ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX,
1861-1913 (1993). During the Civil War, Illinois Senator John Trumbull made the following ap-
peal in favor of progressive taxation: "[When the poor] are fighting to protect the millionaires
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taxation believed that a person should not pay a higher tax rate just be-
cause he or she earned a higher income.' For most of the nineteenth cen-
tury, however, this country did not collect an income tax at all.
The debate over progressive taxation intensified at the turn of the
twentieth century with the passage of the Sixteenth Amendment, which
permitted a federal income tax.4 In 1913, Congress passed its first
"lawful" income tax.5 To the dismay of many, it was progressive.6 Prior to
the Sixteenth Amendment, the debate over the proper form of income
tax went relatively unnoticed. When the income tax debate started to af-
fect the pocketbooks of an entire nation, people began to pay more atten-
tion.7
From the outset, scholars expressed dissatisfaction with the notion of
8progressive taxation. Early writers criticized progressive taxation on the
basis that it was "unfair" to pay greater than one's proportionate share.9
As one writer contended, it is "untenable ... that a man's ability to pay
ought to be taken as a measure of what he should be made to pay."10
who are receiving hundreds of thousands of income every year... the millionaires can afford to
pay liberally of their means." Id. at 34 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong., 1st Sess. 2513
(1864)).
3. See generally STANLEY, supra note 2. Pennsylvania Senator Thaddeus Stevens once noted
that "it is a strange way to punish men because they are rich." Id. at 33 (quoting CONG. GLOBE,
38th Cong., 1st Sess. 1875 (1864)). His colleague, Justin Morrill, commented that while "no one
doubts our constitutional power to levy this tax, [the graduated rate] is in fact no less than a con-
fiscation of property." Id. at 33 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong. 1st Sess. 1875, 1943 (1864)).
4. Ratified in 1913, the Sixteenth Amendment reads: "The Congress shall have power to lay
and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the
several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration." U.S. CONST. amend. XVI.
5. See ROBERT E. HALL & ALVIN RABUSHKA, THE FLAT TAX 21 (2d ed. 1995). Hall and
Rabushka refer to the 1913 federal income tax as the "first lawful federal income tax." Id. In
truth, there were others. For example, there was a Civil War income tax that lasted from 1861 to
1872. See id. at 20. What Hall and Rabushka meant by "lawful," and what I hope to convey by
adopting their term, is that the 1913 income tax was the first one enacted with express constitu-
tional support.
6. See JOHN F. WiTIE, THE POLITICS AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX
78 (1985) ("The final income tax provisions that emerged from conference and became law on
October 3, 1913, were a blend of compromises .... The exemption for dependent children was
dropped, but the marriage differential remained, as did the graduated rate structure that the
radicals forced through the Senate."); HALL & RABUSHKA, supra note 5, at 20 ("[The 1913 in-
come tax] imposed six 'super tax' brackets of 1 percent each on additional chunks of taxable in-
come, reaching a top rate of 7 percent on taxable income over $500,000.").
7. Upon U.S. intervention in World War I, Congress dramatically increased both the rates
and the progressivity of the income tax. The lowest bracket was raised from one to six percent,
and the highest bracket went from seven to seventy-seven percent. See HALL & RABUSHKA, su-
pra note 5, at 21. In addition, the large exemptions were reduced. See id. "The income tax was
transformed from a tax on the wealthy to a tax on the burgeoning middle class." Id.
8. See generally Frank Warren Hackett, The Constitutionality of the Graduated Income Tax
Law, 25 YALE L.J. 427 (1916); Note, Progressive Income Taxes, 12 COLUM. L. REV. 443 (1912).
9. See Hackett, supra note 8, at 445 (decrying the fairness of progressive income tax); Note,
supra note 8, at 445 (questioning application of a case upholding the constitutionality of an in-
heritance tax case to the income tax).
10. Hackett, supra note 8, at 437.
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Still, it was not until the celebrated 1952 classic, The Uneasy Case for
Progressive Taxation," by Professors Blum and Kalven, that a systematic
and scholarly analysis of progressive taxation was undertaken.
Significantly, Professors Blum and Kalven criticized progressive taxation
primarily on economic grounds and conceded its constitutionality."
In his 1985 book, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent
Domain,3 Professor Richard Epstein added a new twist to the debate
over progressive taxation. He questioned the constitutionality of progres-
sive taxes, suggesting that they might violate the Fifth Amendment Tak-
ings Clause. 4 However, despite his unalterably critical view of progres-
sive taxation, Epstein tempered his criticism with the honest admission
that his conclusions ignored Supreme Court decisions and contradicted
precedent in some instances.15 Epstein conceded that his claims would
have far-reaching import and might require invalidation of much post-
New Deal jurisprudence and legislation. 6
After some years of dormancy, my friend and colleague, constitu-
tional law scholar Calvin Massey, has undertaken a constitutional attack
on progressive taxation that revives Epstein's theories. 7 Massey takes the
path that his predecessors had hitherto avoided. Shedding Epstein's con-
cession that the Supreme Court has upheld progressive taxation, he ar-
gues that the Court has never squarely addressed the question and
should, in fact, find it unconstitutional.
I dispute Massey's conclusion that progressive taxation is unconstitu-
tional; established doctrine correctly resolves the constitutional question
in favor of the government's power to tax progressively. This article will
examine Massey's propositions, and it will reveal the well-founded consti-
tutional underpinnings of progressive taxation.' The myriad tax policy
arguments for progressive taxation, in union with the compelling gov-
11. Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, 19 U.
CHI. L. REV. 417 (1952).
12. See id. at 427 ("[T]he result [of Supreme Court decisions upholding progressive taxation]
seems clearly sound on constitutional grounds even when tested against current notions of sub-
stantive due process.").
13. RICHARD EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN (1985).
14. See id. at 295-303. The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution reads, "[n]o person
shall ... be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation." U.S. CONST. amend. V.
15. See EPSTEIN, supra note 13, at ix-x.
16. See id. at ix, 281.
17. See Calvin R. Massey, Takings and Progressive Rate Taxation, 20 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 85 (1996).
18. As I hope this article makes clear, I feel that policy considerations argue strongly against
imposing Fifth Amendment constraints on progressive taxation. Simply put, the vital role taxes
play in the existence and functioning of the government should persuade the Court to uphold the
power to tax progressively.
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ernmental need to collect taxes, drive the Court to view expansively Con-
gress's taxation powers. This presumption of constitutionality cannot be
overstated; the Court sees taxation as the domain of the legislature. I
conclude that the sovereign's broad power to tax requires judicial defer-
ence to legislative choices among different taxation regimes.
Part II of this piece familiarizes the reader with Massey's argument. It
includes an explanation of the debate over progressive and proportional
or "flat"-rate taxation, and a short survey of other writers who, like
Massey, take exception to progressive taxation.
Part III contains the bulk of my response to Massey's argument, in
which I make the case that progressive taxation is, indeed, constitutional.
First, I demonstrate the breadth of the government's consistently sanc-
tioned and highly discretionary power to tax. I then lay out the categories
of taxes that have been shown to violate the Constitution, and I explain
why progressive taxation does not fit into any of those categories.
Finally, in Part IV, I address the particular arguments advanced by
Calvin Massey in his attempt to discredit progressive taxation. I respond
that his primary attack, a resort to "benefits" theory,' 9 is inapplicable to
progressive taxation, and most responsible policymakers do not advance
it in support of progressive taxation. The Supreme Court has vindicated
this view on numerous occasions. The world in which we live gives legis-
latures wide latitude to craft methods of taxation. The Supreme Court is,
at best, reluctant to second guess legislatures. Even Massey ultimately
must yield to pragmatism.
Before I begin, it bears mention that my tax colleagues reacted with
what could be charitably described as skepticism to Massey's constitu-
tional arguments. Their reaction may be attributable to the existence of
an uneasy relationship between constitutional law scholars and tax schol-
ars.20 Neither seems inclined to tread in the other's domain.21 Despite my
colleagues' reaction, I see Calvin Massey's work as a useful and legiti-
mate inquiry into a matter tax scholars appear to take for granted.
II. PROGRESSIVE TAXATION
This Part begins with a brief survey and explanation of the debate
over progressive taxation. Although many scholars support progressive
taxes on grounds of fairness and efficiency, others object that progressive
19. For a description of benefits theory, see infra notes 81-89 and accompanying text.
20. I ask the reader's indulgence in not seeing the latter as oxymoronic.
21. A disclaimer may be appropriate. I cannot be described as a close student of constitu-
tional law. My expertise, if it can be called that, is in tax policy. Normally, I would defer to Calvin
Massey's constitutional expertise, not only out of politeness or courtesy, but because he has
taught me much about the strange and arcane currents of constitutional law.
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taxation is neither fair nor efficient. The second section brings arguments
against progressive taxation to the surface. These arguments will give the
reader a sense of the backdrop against which Calvin Massey wrote his ar-
ticle. The last section summarizes Massey's contribution to the fray. He
asserts that the Supreme Court should declare that progressive taxation is
an unconstitutional taking because the government does not justly com-
pensate wealthier taxpayers who surrender a higher proportion of their
income.
A. A Progressive Taxation Primer
In An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations,
Adam Smith observed, "[a]ll nations have endeavored ... to render their
taxes as equal as they could contrive; as certain, as convenient to the con-
tributor, both in the time and in the mode of payment, and in proportion
to the revenue which they brought to the prince, as little burdensome to
the people."22 Smith is but one of many great thinkers who have noted
what should be obvious; a system of taxation should be fair. 3 That is, the
burden of paying a tax should be borne equally or at least be levied in a
consistent and rational fashion.2 ' As one might expect, fair distribution of
the tax burden is a central concern for legislatures enacting tax laws.25
22. ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS 417 (James E. Thorold Rogers ed., 3d ed. 1869) (1776).
23. See Dane v. Jackson, 256 U.S. 589, 598-99 (1920); Tappan v. Merchants' National Bank,
86 U.S. 490, 504 (19 Wallace 1873); Morton Salt Co. v. City of South Hutchinson, 159 F.2d 897,
901 (10th Cir. 1947); Neil H. Jacoby, Guidelines of Income Tax Reform for the 1960's, in 1 TAX
REVISION COMPENDIUM, HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 157, 158-
60 (Comm. Print 1959); Joseph T. Sneed, The Criteria of Federal Income Tax Policy, 17 STAN. L.
REV. 567, 574-86 (1965).
24. While the policy underpinnings of this premise are solid, I voice doubts in the article that
fairness (at least as a substantive proposition) is of constitutional dimension.
25. See, e.g., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986, H.R. CONF. REP.
NO. 841, at 7 (1986) (indicating that its primary objective is to ensure that individuals with simi-
lar income pay similar amounts of tax); SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE REPORT ON THE TAX
EQUITY AND FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF 1982, S. REP. NO. 494, at 97 (1982) (stating that
the Act is designed to improve tax equity); RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE,
PUBLIC FINANCE IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 5-6 (1973) ("[T]ransfer policies [distributions be-
tween wealthy and poor] remain of major importance."); JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX
POLICY 5 (1987)(explaining that "[a] distinct policy objective of the federal taxation scheme is
the distribution function"); JOEL SLEMROD AND JON BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A
CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO THE GREAT DEBATE OVER TAX REFORM 49 (1996) ("Fairness ... de-
serves close scrutiny because much of the bewildering complexity of the tax law is justified in its
name.").
In July 1999, the Republicans in both Houses of Congress were drafting tax bills aimed at the
so-called "marriage penalty," because they believed it was unfair. See Richard W. Stevenson,
Clinton Warns Against G.O.P. Tax Cuts, N. Y. TIMES, July 17, 1999, at A20. Representative Mi-
chael Castle of Delaware, commenting on the bill being written in the House, said, "[m]y final
concern is whether this is the most fair tax bill we could produce.... I believe the bill drafted in
the Senate is superior because it provides more tax relief for lower and middle income families,
encourages saving and provides more relief from the marriage penalty." 145 CONG. REC. H6213.
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However, crafting a system of taxation that results in a fair distribu-
tion has proven to be a daunting task. In their attempt to achieve a fair
distribution of the tax burden, tax policy-makers rely on two crude prin-
ciples: horizontal equity and vertical equity. 6 Horizontal equity provides
that similarly situated taxpayers should be similarly taxed.27 It is an intui-
tive concept that enjoys wide acceptance. s
The principle of vertical equity, however, is much more controver-
sial.29 Vertical equity requires that high-income taxpayers should contrib-
ute more tax dollars to the fisc than low-income taxpayers) ° It concerns
"[t]he proper pattern of unequal taxes among people with unequal in-
comes."
31
The search for vertical equity, or the proper tax distribution among
people with unequal incomes, is the source of my conflict with Massey.32
To place our disagreement in sharp focus, it is useful to describe the two
most common tax structures that seek to achieve vertical equity.33 A pro-
The Republicans are not alone. A recent poll showed that "[m]any tax professionals want
Congress to end the 'marriage penalty,' under which couples filing jointly can pay up to $7,000
more in taxes annually. 'It is simply not fair that two wage earners who just happen to be legally
married pay more taxes than two wage earners who are just living together,' one respondent
wrote." David Cay Johnston, Personal Business: Diary; A Wish List of Changes for the Federal
Tax Code, N. Y. TIMES, November 22, 1998, at D10.
Even the Executive takes pains to cite fairness as a centerpiece of tax initiatives. See John M.
Broder, With the Federal Deficit Falling, the President Weighs a Tax Cut, N. Y. TIMES, Dec. 5,
1997, at Al (indicating that President Clinton would consider tax reduction if it was "fair").
26. For a sophisticated but concise discussion of problems defining horizontal equity and
vertical equity, see generally Richard A. Musgrave, Horizontal Equity, Once More, 43 NAT'L
TAX J. 113 (1990).
27. See GEORGE F. BREAK & JOSEPH A. PECHMAN, FEDERAL TAX REFORM: THE IM-
POSSIBLE DREAM? 5 (1975) (explaining that a system that treats equally all those who are in
economically similar positions is known as horizontal equity); MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra
note 25, at 5 ; David M. Hudson, Tax Policy and the Federal Taxation of the Transfer of Wealth,
19 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 1, 3 (1983) (stating that similarly situated persons should be taxed in a
similar manner); Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Equality, Liberty, and a Fair Income Tax, 23
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607, 619 (1996) (horizontal equity "says that those with equal amounts of
income should pay equal amounts of tax").
28. See BREAK & PECHMAN, supra note 27, at 79-80 ("[M]ost people subscribe to at least
the general principle of horizontal equity."). While I do not quarrel with the principle, I will
save for another time my questions concerning its constitutional underpinnings.
29. See, e.g., Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 18 (1992) (upholding a tax which favored pre-
1976 property owners advantageously over purchasers of California property after 1976).
30. See BREAK & PECHMAN, supra note 27, at 5 (vertical equity is "the distribution of tax
burdens among people with different amounts of income and wealth...."); Hudson, supra note
27, at 4.
31. MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 25, at 199.
32. Calvin Massey is a proponent of using a proportional or "flat" tax rate to achieve verti-
cal equity. See Massey, supra note 17, at 85, n.2. I prefer progressive taxation.
33. This analysis assumes that the subject of the progressive scheme is the income tax. It is,
of course, possible to tax progressively in other than an income tax scheme. Some early tax cases,
for example, dealt with the progressive features of wealth transfer taxes. See, e.g., Knowlton v.
Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 109 (1900) (discussing progressivity of inheritance tax); see also Donna M.
Byrne, Progressive Taxation Revisited, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 739, 742 (1995) (discussing progressivity
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portional, or so-called "flat rate" tax, applies the same percentage rate of
taxation to all taxpayers. For example, with a 10% flat rate of taxation, a
taxpayer who earns $10,000 in a year would pay a tax of $1,000 and a tax-
payer who earns $3 million would pay a tax of $300,000.
A progressive tax, on the other hand, applies an increasing percentage
rate of taxation as income increases?4 For instance, with a progressive
rate of taxation, a taxpayer who earns $10,000 in a year might pay at a
5% rate resulting in a tax of $500. A taxpayer who earns $3 million might
pay at a 35% rate resulting in a tax of $1,050,000.
The point of contention is not that higher-income earners should con-
tribute more absolute tax dollars;35 rather, the debate centers on how
much more they should contribute. A progressive system attempts to
recognize that each dollar matters more to a poor person than it does to a
wealthy person. Thus, the payment of a $500 tax may affect the taxpayer
who earns $10,000 more than the loss of $1,050,000 affects the taxpayer
who earns $3 million.36
Legislatures often choose progressive taxation over strictly propor-
tional taxation when attempting to achieve a fair distribution of tax bur-
dens.37 Two scholars once observed that "progressive taxation appears to
be the choice of modern democratic societies., 38 Likewise, a broad con-
sensus agrees that a flat tax is no panacea. In a recent round of tax legis-
lation, for example, the Joint Committee on Taxation discussed the ef-
fects of a new progressive tax scheme on individuals and families.39 The
Committee concluded that "[the fairness] dilemma cannot be resolved by
moving to a proportional tax system. ' 4°
Aside from issues of fairness, policymakers sometimes lean toward
in the context of consumption and wealth transfer taxes). I will not address the merits, such as
they may be, of a "head tax" which undertakes to tax each person the same amount without re-
gard to ability to pay. On this topic, see Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and
the Rate Structure: A New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L. REV. 1905, 1913 (1987).
Even Massey rejects such an approach because of its regressivity. See Massey, supra note 17, at
87.
34. In Calvin Massey's parlance, a progressive tax takes a greater percentage of Bill Gates's
income than it takes from lesser mortals. See Massey, supra note 17, at 104-105. Note that above
the income level at which the top rate applies, the tax becomes a flat tax and the super-rich are
taxed at the same rate as the merely well-off.
35. That war is waged between the defenders of the "head" tax and the defenders of either
the proportional or the progressive tax. See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
36. See MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 25, at 250-255.
37. See WEBBER & WILDAVSKY, supra note 2, at 320-23 (1986) (explaining that progressive
taxation was popular in the 19th century because it was seen as fair). During the Civil War, even
the Confederacy adopted a progressive tax system as a means of generating revenue. See JAMES
M. MCPHERSON, BATTLE CRY OF FREEDOM 615 (1988).
38. BREAK & PECHMAN, supra note 27, at 6.
39. See STAFF OF THE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 105TH CONG., IMPACT ON INDI-
VIDUALS AND FAMILIES OF REPLACING THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX (1997).
40. Id. at 101.
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progressive taxes because they raise more money than flat taxes.41 In
truth, the actual economic effects of progressive schemes of taxation on
the generation of revenue remain fertile grounds for debate. 42 However,
that subject is too broad to examine here and is (fortunately) not neces-S • 43
sary to establish that progressive taxation is constitutional.
B. Dissatisfaction with Progressivity
Scholars have long recognized that progressive taxation has never
been well-justified." The difficulty stems from the indeterminacy of such
41. See, e.g., Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Individual Tax Reform for Fairness and Simplicity: Let
Economic Growth Fend for Itself, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 459,465 (1993). Dismayed by recent
reductions in the progressivity of the income tax, Professor McMahon contends that "the partial
victory of the 'flat taxers' should be repudiated and progressivity in the rate structure restored.
Marginal income tax rates for those at the very top of the income distribution should be in-
creased even more. Doing so will improve vertical equity and enhance revenues." Id. at 465
(emphasis added).
This statement requires explanation and qualification. Assuming that the government needs
a fixed amount of revenue, resort to a flat tax necessarily means that the burden borne by the
wealthy is shifted to the poor or at least the less-wealthy. The more limited ability of low income
taxpayers to pay, combined with their relatively greater numbers, means that it will cost more to
collect the same amount of revenue with a proportional tax than with a progressive tax.
42. Other-than-economic justifications for progressive taxation abound. See, e.g., Marjorie
Kornhauser, The Rhetoric of the Anti-Progressive Income Tax Movement: A Typical Male Reac-
tion, 86 MICH. L. REV. 465, 509-18 (1987) (justifying progressivity on feminist grounds); Beverly
Moran & William Whitford, A Black Critique of the Internal Revenue Code, WIS. L. REV. 751,
752-53 (1996) (justifying progressivity on racial grounds).
43. Economists' opinions of progressive and proportional taxation vary greatly. One view is
that a flat tax scheme is the solution to the revenue generation problem. See ROBERT E. HALL &
ALVIN RABUSHKA, Low TAX, SIMPLE TAX, FLAT TAX 53 (1983)("[T]he simple [flat] tax will
bring the faltering American economy back to life."). Adherents to this view believe that a pro-
gressive tax is detrimental to the entrepreneurial enterprise and is a disincentive to work and to
save. See id. at 53-57. On the other hand, some economists believe that the disincentives to work
created by progressive taxation are minimal and that many workers cannot simply change their
work patterns to respond to changing tax rates. See Martin J. McMahon, Jr., Renewing Progres-
sive Taxation, 60 TAX NOTES 109, 111 (1993) ("[M]ost empirical studies indicate that the work
effort of primary wage earners does not change significantly in response to after-tax pay
changes .... "). McMahon crosses the borderline with his uncharitable observation that the rock
icon Madonna may have reduced her tax liability if she had worked a little less, but that may
have been a positive effect in and of itself. See id. at 112, n.34. Additionally, these economists
assert that a progressive tax rate is an effective method of generating income and may actually
help maintain a constraint on government spending. See id. Other economists view progressivity
though a different lens. See Gene Steuerle, How a Progressive and Broad-Based Income Tax
Constrains Government Activity, 52 TAX NOTES 225 (1991) (criticizing progressive taxation on
the basis that it provides inadequate revenue based on low rates for middle income taxpayers
and even lower rates for poor taxpayers).
44. See, e.g., Boris Bittker, The Income Tax: How Progressive Should It Be?, in COLLECTED
LEGAL ESSAYS 229, 233 (1989) (discussing how the case for progressive taxation is uneasy);
MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, THE DECLINE (AND FALL?) OF THE INCOME TAX 220-226 (1997)
(discussing relative satisfaction and dissatisfaction with progressivity); Byrne, supra note 33, at
740 (arguing that the case for progressivity is uneasy because of unexamined philosophical as-
sumptions); Nancy C. Staudt, The Political Economy of Taxation: A Critical Review of a Classic,
30 L. & SOC'Y REV. 651, 665 (1996) (outlining the difficulty of establishing a "fair" rate of taxa-
tion).
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concepts as "justice" and "fairness., 45 These vague and standardless
terms contain no prescription for how best to achieve them.46 Although
progressive taxation has ample support from the government and acade-
mia alike, it has also attracted many critics.
In their classic 1952 study, The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation,
Professors Blum and Kalven examined the ability (or rather inability) of
progressive taxation to generate revenue efficiently.47 They addressed
three separate concerns about progressive tax systems. 8 First, progressive
taxes can become too complicated, and clever taxpayers can use loop-
holes "lawfully" to avoid paying taxes.49 The second concern, celebrated
by economists as the reason to avoid progressive taxes, is that society's
economic productivity falls when a rising tax rate diminishes the incentive
to generate more income. 0 Finally, Blum and Kalven described progres-
sive income taxation as a "politically irresponsible formula" because it
enables a majority (middle and lower income level earners) to set tax
rates that fall exclusively upon the minority (high income earners).51
Like Professors Blum and Kalven before him, Professor Ronald Ro-
tunda of the University of Illinois also argued against progressive taxa-
tion on economic grounds.52 Straying from his constitutional law exper-
tise, Rotunda effectively captured the essence of the Blum and Kalven
economic policy arguments against the progressive rate structure. He
maintained that a flat tax would really be more "progressive" because
historical evidence suggests that when overall tax rates are lower, higher
income earners declare more taxable income and actually pay more
taxes.53 Rotunda also argued that progressive taxation not only unneces-
sarily complicates the tax code, but is counterproductive because tax shel-
ters allow the truly wealthy to avoid paying the higher rates.54 He con-
cluded that by eliminating tax shelters, reducing deductions, and setting
45. Bankman & Griffith, supra note 33, at 1913; see also Leo P. Martinez, Taxes, Morals and
Legitimacy, 1994 BYU L. REV. 521, 549 n.102 (1994).
46. See Charles R. O'Kelley, Jr., Tax Policy for Post-Liberal Society: A Flat-Tax-Inspired
Redefinition of the Purpose and Ideal Structure of a Progressive Income Tax, 58 S. CAL. L. REV.
727, 738 (1985) (explaining that redistribution is insufficient justification for progressivity be-
cause it provides no design guidance).
47. See Blum & Kalven, supra note 11, at 430-37.
48. See id.
49. See id. at 431.
50. See id. at 437-38.
51. Id. at 435-36.
52. See Ronald D. Rotunda, Flat Taxes: A Progressive Way To Go, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 27,
1995, at 20.
53. See id. As Kevin Phillips has pointed out, however, the less progressive tax regime re-
sults in an increase in wealth of the rich and the relative impoverishment of the poor. See KEVIN
PHILLIPS, THE POLITICS OF RICH AND POOR 23-25 (1990).
54. See Rotunda, supra note 52.
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an income floor below which nobody would pay taxes, a flat tax would
actually increase tax revenues generated from the higher income earn-
55
ers.
Rotunda argued that the complexity of the Internal Revenue Code
breeds unfairness; he suggested that a reduction in capital gains taxes
would be fair and that a flat tax would result in a more equitable alloca-
tion of the tax burden among income classes. 6 At its core, Rotunda's ad-
vocacy for a flat tax simply exploits the indeterminacy of "justice" and
"fairness." While Rotunda does not explicitly concede the constitutional-
ity of progressive taxation, he neither attacks nor questions it.57
Taking a decidedly different tack, Professor Richard Epstein em-
ployed a literal reading of the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause to ques-
tion the constitutionality of many forms of interference with private
property rights, including progressive taxation, in his book, Takings: Pri-
vate Property and the Power of Eminent Domain.58 According to Ep-
stein's theory of the Takings Clause, progressive taxation is unconstitu-
tional because the government is unlawfully "taking" private property for
public use without providing appropriate compensation to the taxpayer.59
Greatly simplified, Epstein grounded his case against progressive
taxation in the following logic: because everyone agrees that it violates
the Eminent Domain Clause for the government to take an individual's
property without compensation to build a road, it must also be unconsti-
tutional to take away a wealthy person's money through taxation and dis-
tribute it to others without adequate compensation. 6° In other words, the
failure of governments to proportionately compensate the wealthy for the
additional taxes they pay means that progressive taxation must violate
the Eminent Domain Clause.61 Convinced that governments cannot com-
pensate taxpayers progressively, Epstein warned, "[t]he case for the pro-
gressive tax [was] not 'uneasy.' It [was] wrong., 62
Epstein's theories were not well-received. 63 One scholar observed that
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See id. Rotunda calls a flat tax "major reform," implicitly conceding that a flat tax is not
the only constitutional possibility.
58. In Epstein's world, progressive income taxation is a prima facie taking. See EPSTEIN,
supra note 13, at 162.
59. See id. at 295-303. Epstein includes under his umbrella, worker's compensation laws,
welfare, and land use regulations. See id. at x. Needless to say, he takes a dim view of even the
public use notion. See id. at 161, 308.
60. See id. at 195-215, 295-303, 308.
61. See id. at 298-300; see also Massey, supra note 17, at 88.
62. EPSTEIN, supra note 13, at 303.
63. See, e.g., Thomas Grey, The Malthusian Constitution, 41 U. MIAMI L. REV. 21, 22-23
(1986); Thomas Ross, Taking Takings Seriously, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 1591, 1592 (1986); Jeremy
Paul, Searching for the Status Quo, 7 CARDOzO L. REV. 743, 744 (1986) (book review); Joseph
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"[f]or most reviewers, [Epstein's] conclusions are so antithetical to con-
ventional wisdom that they discredit the entire book." ' Another kind
scholar stated that, from an academic perspective, Epstein's book is a
"patent and howling failure," although he concluded that it might influ-
61
ence the "popular audience" of learned non-lawyers.
Beyond the broadsides, however, nobody directly challenged the
premise that progressive taxation is a taking.66 Epstein's admission that
his conclusions ignored Supreme Court decisions perhaps best explains
this lack of response.6' Despite his offer of constitutional challenges to
various kinds of state action on Takings Clause-grounds, he conceded
that the Court had not been open to these challenges: "In instance after
instance the Court has held state controls to be compatible with the rights
of private property.,
68
C. Calvin Massey's Case Against Progressivity
Blum, Kalven, Rotunda, and Epstein worked from the premise that
the power to tax progressively is firmly entrenched in contemporary con-
stitutional jurisprudence. Calvin Massey does not accept this assumption.
Like Epstein, Massey argues that progressive taxation constitutes a
"taking" within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment." Although Massey
admits that Epstein's ideas have been "dismissed by academics," his arti-
cle nevertheless revives Epstein's theories to examine anew the implica-
tions of the Takings Clause for progressive taxation.70 In an evolutionary
step beyond Epstein, Massey's fundamental proposition is this: the Su-
preme Court has never explicitly decided whether progressive taxation is
an uncompensated regulatory taking, and therefore the Court could de-
clare progressive taxation unconstitutional if presented with the issue to-
day.71 Looking to Epstein's theory as a "powerful and elegant logical ex-
position of limits on the power of governments to seize property,"
Massey argues that a straightforward application of the Court's contem-
porary regulatory holdings doctrine should render progressive taxation
Sax, Takings, 53 U. CHI. L. REv. 279, 280 (1986) (book review).
64. Thomas W. Merrill, Rent Seeking and the Compensation Principle, 80 Nw. U. L. REV.
1561, 1562 (1986) (book review).
65. Ross, supra note 63, at 1592.
66. See Sax, supra note 63, at 280-285; see also MASSEY, supra note 17, at 90.
67. See EPSTEIN, supra note 13, at ix-x.
68. Id. at x.
69. See Massey, supra note 17, at 101 (citing Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1,
24-25 (1916)).
70. Massey, supra note 17, at 85-86.
71. See id. at 88.
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unconstitutional.72
Massey begins with a historical review of Supreme Court decisions
concerning the validity of the income tax.73 He contends that the Court
has never expressly considered whether the Takings Clause bars progres-
sive taxation. Massey further believes that in a 1916 opinion, Brushaber
v. Union Pacific Railroad,75 the Court intimated that the Fifth Amend-
ment's Takings Clause could invalidate an "arbitrary" tax enacted for the
"confiscation of property. 7 6 According to Massey, because the Court has
never revisited the issue, the constitutionality of progressive income taxa-
tion remains "territory totally unexplored by the Court.,
77
Massey then examines what he calls the "boundary between taxation
and taking., 78 Noting that the Court has used the Equal Protection and
Free Speech guarantees to invalidate tax laws, he reasons that the Tak-
ings Clause should also limit tax laws because the limits it places on state
power are no less important than those of other constitutional provi-
• 79
sions. Unfortunately, Massey proposes no test to determine when taxa-
tion crosses the "boundary" and becomes a taking.80 Massey simply seems
to argue that a "taking" occurs whenever the government takes a greater
percentage of one person's income than another's. As will be made clear,
this position is untenable.
Massey next attempts to discredit the arguments that seek to explain
72. Id. at 94.
73. See id. at 95-102. Massey examines the following cases: Springer v. United States, 102 U.S.
586 (1881), which rejects the belief that the income tax is an unapportioned direct tax; Pacific
Ins. Co. v. Soule, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 433 (1869), which concludes that a tax on the income of insur-
ance companies was indirect; Scholey v. Rew, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 331, 346 (1875), which holds that
a "succession tax" on real property was an "excise tax" and not an unapportioned direct tax;
Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 (1895), modified on reh'g, 158 U.S. 601
(1895), which holds that the income tax at issue was an invalid direct tax; Magoun v. Illinois
Trust & Say. Bank, 170 U.S. 283 (1898), which rejects the theory that a progressive rate state in-
heritance tax violated equal protection; and Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1 (1916),
which holds that the income tax did not violate the Due Process Clause.
74. See Massey, supra note 17, at 102.
75. 240 U.S. 1 (1916).
76. See Massey, supra note 17, at 121 (citing Brushaber, 240 U.S. at 24-25). Presumably, such
an arbitrary tax would be constitutionally impermissible under the "harsh and oppressive" ru-
bric. See infra Part III.
77. Massey, supra note 17, at 102.
78. Id. at 102.
79. See id. at 103-104. Massey says that:
[N]o one would argue that the Equal Protection Clause would permit an income tax
system that imposed differential rates based on the race of the taxpayer. Similarly, no
one would contend that the Free Speech Clause would allow an income tax system that
imposed higher tax rates on income derived from the authorship of political books as
compared to rates imposed on income from other sources. Likewise, the Takings
Clause necessarily limits the taxing power. After all, taxation is, by definition, a taking.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
80. Of primary importance to Massey is the degree to which the Takings Clause should limit
progressive taxation. See id. at 104.
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why taxation is not an uncompensated taking-benefit theory and sacri-
fice theory." According to benefit theory, the distribution of government
benefits increases with income, and the tax structure should reflect this.8 2
Massey concludes that "a successful defense of progressive tax rates must
demonstrate that as a taxpayer's income increases, the taxpayer receives
an ever-increasing proportion of the public benefits purchased with tax
revenues."83
Benefit theory is divided into two arguments, "property benefits" and
"income-equals-benefit."8 The "property benefits" argument suggests
that, although personal benefits are roughly uniform, the amount of
property benefits rises with the amount of property owned.85 Massey dis-
penses with that notion by pointing out that public expenditures do not
increase with a person's property: "National defense, internal security
(such as police and fire protection), and the legal system are all public
benefits critical to property protection. But providing these benefits in
sufficient quantity to protect persons will also necessarily protect prop-
erty.,86 An increase in one person's property will not translate into added
defense expenditures, thus the wealthier taxpayer receives no added
benefit for the higher taxes he pays.
The "income-equals-benefit" argument suggests that personal income
is the measure of the "personal well-being" that the government pro-
tects.87 Thus, a wealthy taxpayer automatically receives more benefit than
a poor taxpayer, even though they receive the same protection by the
same government. According to Massey, this is "the perfect justification
for a single-rate proportional tax. It does nothing, however, to justify
progressive rate taxation." 8
Massey holds that while benefit theory suffices to justify taxation, "it
fails to explain why progressive rate taxation is not an uncompensated
taking, because benefit theory does not prove that the share of benefits
received increases with income.,
89
Massey then turns to sacrifice theory. According to sacrifice theory,
"[e]quity 'requires inflicting equal hurt on each taxpayer." ' 9° However,
sacrifice theorists do not calculate "hurt" with monetary units; rather,
81. See id. at 105-110.
82. See id. at 105-6.





88. Id. at 107.
89. Id. (emphasis in original).
90. Id. at 108 (quoting Blum & Kalven, supra note 11, at 455-56).
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they measure in terms of the utility of money. Sacrifice theorists assume
that, as income increases, the utility of each additional dollar is less than
the previous one. Thus "[i]f the utility value of income declines with in-
creases in income, progressive tax rates are required to produce a propor-
tionately equal sacrifice of utility."9'
Massey attacks sacrifice theory from several angles. First, he argues
that nobody has shown that the utility curve for money is steep enough to
warrant progressive tax rates.92 If it is, then the tax system will be unfair
because the whole tax burden could potentially fall on the wealthy, pro-
vided their utility level never rises to that of a person of moderate in-
come.93 Second, Massey is not convinced that money actually has declin-
ing utility. Pointing to the versatility of money, Massey observes that, for
such ventures as savings and philanthropy, utility may remain constant or
actually increase with income. Finally, Massey points out that everybody
will have a different utility curve. "For sacrifice theory to help defend
progressive tax rates, it is necessary to establish that every person has the
same utility curve for money. But even the dimmest observer of humanity
must concede that this is simply not the case." 94
Having dismissed these defenses of progressive taxation, Massey then
considers how the Court should apply current regulatory takings doctrine
to find progressive taxation unconstitutional. 9 Drawing upon his experi-
ence in constitutional law, Massey asserts that, when confronted with a
takings issue, the Supreme Court "employs a two-step process composed
of three litmus-test rules and a catch-all balancing test."96 Assuming the
role of the Court, Massey applies two of the Court's litmus-test rules and
its catch-all balancing test to progressive taxation, explaining and illus-
trating the tests along the way.
The first litmus-test rule, permanent dispossession, says that "[w]hen
regulations of property permanently dispossess an owner of his property,
a per se taking has occurred." 97 Massey believes the Court could find that
the "marginal increment taken by progressive tax rates" is permanently
dispossessed and therefore an uncompensated taking.8 The second rule,
91. Id.
92. See id.
93. See id. at 109.
94. Id.
95. See id. at 111-123.
96. Id. at 111.
97. Id. at 112. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan, 458 U.S. 419 (1982), is most closely asso-
ciated with this concept. There, the Court held that a New York regulation authorizing a cable
television company to attach coaxial cable to an apartment building caused a permanent dispos-
session and thus constituted an uncompensated taking. See id. at 441.
98. Id. at 112 (emphasis in original).
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loss of economically viable use, maintains that "[i]f a regulation of prop-
erty leaves the owner with no economically viable use, it is a taking."99
Massey also believes the Court could extend this rule-a rule commonly
associated with real property-to protect a taxpayer who "has lost all
economic use of that disproportionate share of income taken by the ap-
plication of graduated tax rates. ' °
If these tests fail to determine whether the law in question violates the
Takings Clause, the Court reverts to its catch-all balancing test.' °1 In this
balancing test, the Court weighs the public benefits of the property taken
by the government against the private costs suffered by the individual
from whom the property is taken.' ° Massey concedes that if progressive
rate taxation is neither "a permanent dispossession of a disproportionate
share of the taxpayer's income, .. . [nor] a destruction of all economically
viable use of that conceptually severed strand of property, there is not
much likelihood that the balancing test will produce a conclusion that
graduated rates are an uncompensated taking."1 3 Undeterred, Massey
still argues that public benefits brought about by progressive taxes might
not outweigh the private costs.' °4
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF PROGRESSIVE TAXATION
Stripped to its core, Massey's argument rests primarily on the Su-
preme Court's seeming intolerance for arbitrary taxes in Brushaber.05
However, neither that case, nor any other, actually supports his attack on
progressive taxation. After discussing the relevance of specific constitu-
tional provisions to taxation, I argue that case law supports broad con-
gressional power to tax progressively. I then describe the Court's general
reluctance to strike down taxes, and discuss those narrow categories in
which the sovereign's power to tax is limited. Not surprisingly, progres-
sive taxation does not fall into any of those categories.
A. The Constitution's Role
The Constitution gives Congress the power "to lay and collect
99. Id. at 117.
100. Id. at 119. Massey looks to Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass'n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S.
470 (1987), and Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Comm'n, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992), two cases in-
volving real property, not taxation, to support this notion. See id. at 118-19.
101. See id. at 120.
102. See id.
103. Id. at 121.
104. See id.
105. See id. at 102 (citing Brushaber v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1916).
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taxes."' 6 Although the Constitution never explicitly addresses progres-
sive taxation, nothing in the text even hints that the framers intended to
limit taxation to a proportional regime. On the contrary, one of the archi-
tects of the Constitution, Thomas Jefferson, supported progressive taxa-
tion. He wrote: "[A] means of silently lessening the inequality of property
is to exempt all from taxation below a certain point, and to tax the higher
portions of property in geometrical progression as they rise."' 07
The legislature's broad discretion to tax survived many challenges in
the nineteenth century but met a roadblock in the Supreme Court's deci-
sion of Pollock v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.1' The Pollock Court struck
down an income tax because it did not meet the constitutional require-
ment that a direct tax be "apportioned among the several states."1°9 This
decision led Congress to pass the Sixteenth Amendment, which allows
Congress "to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source de-
rived, without apportionment among the several States, and without re-
gard to any census or enumeration."'' 0
The Sixteenth Amendment was one of three constitutional amend-
ments proposed and ratified during the Progressive Era, a time charac-
terized by "reformers who sought to root out corruption, refine American
politics, and make it more democratic. 1 . If progressive taxation were so
patently offensive to the democratic ideal that it could be characterized
as an unconstitutional taking, at least a hint of that sentiment should have
appeared in the legislative history. There is none. "2
Two pervasive themes in the 61st Congress-which drafted the Six-
106. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
107. Thomas Jefferson, Letter to James Madison (Oct. 28, 1785), in THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 681, 682 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1953).
108. 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
109. Pollock, 157 U.S. at 607 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3).
110. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. Representative Clark, who took part in the debates over the
Amendment, called the Pollock decision on the income tax of 1894 "one of the great blots on the
judicial system of this country." 44 CONG. REC. 4392 (1909).
111. JOHN R. VILE, A COMPANION TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND ITS
AMENDMENTS 199 (2d ed. 1997).
112. Congress was not only concerned with laying to rest general questions on the constitu-
tionality of the income tax, but also with a desire to prevent future Court infringement on their
taxation power. There was thus an impetus to create a legislative history which would not restrict
their power in the future over the income tax. Notably, an amendment was proposed to the
phrase "and may grade the same," giving distinct and specific authority to grade an income tax.
See id. at 4108. Proponent Representative Bailey viewed this addition as "necessary only as a
matter of abundant caution," prompted by Justice Brewer's dissent in Knowlton v. Moore argu-
ing that Congress has no power to grade taxes. Bailey later withdrew this amendment based on
anticipated voice vote against it on a purely political basis. See id. at 4120. He feared the Court
would view a rejection of the proposal as a sign that Congress was opposed to a graduated in-
come tax. See id. The record shows that the Vice-President indicated the requirement for a
unanimous consent to withdrawal by the rest of the Senate. When the vote was taken, there was
no objection to withdrawal of the phrase - indicating no desire to create a legislative history
precluding a graduated income tax. See id.
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teenth Amendment-explain the lack of attention to progressivity. These
themes evince an implied legislative intent to allow a progressive tax.
First, redistribution (or fairness) values were important to the debate. In
the House, discussion centered around the reality that richer states were
paying less tax than they rightly should. For example, Representative
Clark argued:
Arkansas has one-sixth as many people as New York has, and would under
[the head tax] pay one-sixth as much direct tax as New York would, but New
York has 30 times as much property value as the State of Arkansas has. So
New Yorkers would escape five-sixths of the taxes they ought to pay ....
[The Democrats] are in favor of amending [the Constitution] so that the
swollen fortunes of the land can be justly taxed.1 13
Representative Payne, who identified himself as an opponent of in-
come taxation, grounded his arguments in fairness:
[The income tax] tends to make a nation of liars; I believe it is the most easily
concealed of any tax that can be laid, the most difficult of enforcement, and
the hardest to collect; that it is, in a word, a tax upon the income of honest
men and an exemption, to a greater or less extent, of the income of the ras-
cals.
1 4
Still, Payne recognized the potential need for an income tax: "[I]f this Na-
tion should ever be under the stress of a great war... [an income tax
would be necessary] to provide an income adequate to the carrying on of
that war."115 For Payne, the need to collect revenue superseded the need
to pass fair tax legislation. The implication was that any unfairness, in-
cluding that which might inhere in a progressive tax, must yield to neces-
sity.
Second, the Congressional record also reveals that the Sixteenth
Amendment was not designed to break new ground."6 Rather, Congress
sought to simply nullify the Pollock decision and remove all doubt that
Congress's right to tax income-a right exercised on three prior occa-
sionsT7 -is constitutional. Representative Clark referred to Congress'
113. 44 CONG. REC. 4392-93 (1909).
114. Id. at 4390.
115. Id.
116. See 44 CONG. REC. 4390-92 (1909).
117. Congress passed its first two income taxes during the Civil War. The first tax imposed
an ungraduated rate of three percent on incomes above $800. See W. ELLIOT BROWNLEE,
FEDERAL TAXATION IN AMERICA 26 (1996). However, in 1865, Congress imposed a rate of five
percent on incomes between $600 and $5000 and ten percent on incomes over $5000. See id. at
26-27. This tax-the nation's first progressive income tax-remained an effective source of reve-
nue until its expiration in 1872. See id. at 29. When support for the income tax reemerged in the
early 1890s, it came with support for a high degree of progressivity. See id. at 36. "Central to the
appeal of a highly progressive income tax during the 1890s was the claim that the tax would both
reallocate fiscal burdens according to 'ability to pay' and help restore a virtuous republic free of
concentrations of economic power." Id. However, complaints about progressivity from most Re-
publicans and northeastern Democrats led Congress to pass a flat tax of two percent on incomes
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previous income tax legislation to support the presumed constitutionality
of the income tax. He noted, "[e]verybody-everybody in the House, at
least-knows that we had two income tax laws prior to the Act of 1894.
They were held to be constitutional." '118 That at least one of these taxes
was progressive implicitly shows congressional support for progressive
taxation at the time the Sixteenth Amendment was adopted.H9
B. Supreme Court Support for Progressive Taxation
The government's power to tax is essentially unlimited.'20 The reason
for this is simple: There is no government without taxation. 2' Throughout
its history, the Supreme Court has acknowledged the powerful and fun-
damental nature of the ability to tax."' From McCulloch v. Maryland123 to
the present, the Court has affirmed this necessary governmental power in
the face of a variety of challenges.'24 In McCulloch, Chief Justice Marshall
recognized the fundamental nature of taxation with his celebrated dictum
regarding state taxation and sovereign immunity:
That the power to tax involves the power to destroy; that the power to de-
stroy may defeat and render useless the power to create; that there is a plain
repugnance in conferring on one government a power to control the constitu-
tional measure of another, which other, with respect to those very measures,
is declared to be supreme over that which exerts the control, are propositions
not to be denied. 25
The Court has taken pains to articulate that the taxation power
over $4000. See id. at 38.
118. 44 CONG. REc. 4392 (1909).
119. See BROWNLEE, supra note 117, at 26-27.
120. See Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655, 663 (1874) ("The power to tax is...
the most pervading of all the powers of government ...."); WEBBER & WILDAVSKY, supra note
2, at 38-147 (outlining ancient systems of taxation).
121. See THOMAS CARLYLE, Signs of the Times, in ESSAYS 5, 16 (1829) (describing govern-
ment as a "taxing machine"); see also People v. Adirondack Ry. Co., 160 N.Y. 225, 236-37 (1899),
affd, 176 U.S. 335 (1900) (Vann, J.). The court held:
The power of taxation [and other powers] underlie the Constitution and rest upon ne-
cessity, because there can be no effective government without them. They are not con-
ferred by the Constitution, but exist because the state exists .... They are ... rights in-
herent in the state as sovereign.... The state cannot surrender them .... They are as
enduring and indestructible as the state itself. Id.
122. See, e.g., Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S.
575, 585 (1983) (holding that differential taxation power is a "powerful weapon against the tax-
payer selected"); Providence Bank v. Billings, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 514, 563 (1830) (holding that the
power to tax "operates on all the persons and property belonging to the body politic" and "has
its foundation in society itself").
123. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
124. See, e.g., Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 223 (1987)
(upholding a state sales tax on general interest magazines challenged on First Amendment
grounds); Society for Savings v. Coite, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 594 (1867) (upholding a franchise tax on
deposits made to Connecticut banks challenged as violating enumerated powers).
125. McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 431.
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"resides in the government as a part of itself" and is "never presumed to
be relinquished."'' 6 Because the taxing power exists "for the benefit of
all" including the government itself, the Court allows seemingly unlimited
taxation of all taxpayers over whom the government has "sovereign
power.', 27 Indeed no less an authority than Richard Epstein has noted
that "[olne constant refrain of political and constitutional history treats
taxation as an inherent and indispensable power of the sovereign."'
28
If the sovereign is omnipotent in the exercise of the taxing power,
surely that power extends to the selection of the method of taxation. If
that is the case, it should follow that progressive taxation is a constitu-
tionally permissible means of taxation. Even cursory research reveals that
the few cases that have even tangentially addressed progressive taxation
support its constitutionality.
As a starting point, in Knowlton v. Moore,129 the executors of a will
challenged a progressive estate tax on numerous grounds.30 The Court
dismissed all claims against the progressive rate feature of the instant tax
as "without merit..'.'. The Court stated that Congress had latitude to en-
act duties, imposts, and excises that would fall very unequally and much
more heavily on some states than on others.132 According to the Court in
Knowlton, the legitimacy of a tax should not be determined by its effect
on individual taxpayers, but on states.
3
Like the individual taxpayer in Knowlton, Massey attacks progressive
taxation because of its effect on individuals, claiming that progressive
taxation violates the Takings Clause.' 34 However, the Court's earlier deci-
sion in County of Mobile v. Kimball'3 clearly established that taxation did
not implicate the Takings Clause.136 Kimball dealt with a taxpayer chal-
lenge to a county tax enacted to provide navigational improvements for
126. Society for Savings, 73 U.S. at 606 (citations omitted).
127. Id. at 604-05; see also Cook v. Tait, 265 U.S. 47, 54 (1924) (concluding that the power to
tax extends to citizens domiciled and income derived from property situated in foreign coun-
tries).
128. Richard A. Epstein, Taxation in a Lockean World, 4 J. SOC. PHIL. & POL'Y 49, 49
(1986).
129. 178 U.S. 41 (1900).
130. The executors protested on three grounds. First, the provisions of the Act violated Ar-
ticle I, Sections eight and nine of the U.S. Constitution. Second, the legacies to certain individu-
als amounted to less than $10,000, and therefore should not have been subject to a tax or duty.
Third, the legacy to another individual was taxed at the wrong rate. See id. at 44-45.
131. Id. at 109.
132. See id. at 106.
133. See id. at 101.
134. See supra Section II.C.
135. 102 U.S. 691 (1880).
136. See id. at 703 ("But neither is taxation for a public purpose, however great, the taking
of private property for public use, in the sense of the Constitution.").
Yale Law & Policy Review Vol. 18:111, 1999
the river, bay, and harbor of Mobile, Alabama.137 The taxpayer claimed,
among other things, that the tax violated the Alabama constitutional
prohibition against the taking of property for public use.138
Although Kimball dealt with a local, rather than a federal tax, the dis-
cussion is instructive because the Alabama Constitution contains a Tak-
ings Clause similar to the federal language.139 According to the Court,
taxation entails a contribution to support government for which a tax-
payer receives a government-provided benefit, while takings entail a
forced exchange of property for its equivalent in money.' 4° The Court saw
taxation and takings as "essentially different.,
141
The Kimball opinion articulated the most compelling reason why
taxation is not a taking. Although taxation is, in a layman's understand-
ing, a taking because the government is using an individual's money for a
public purpose, it is not a constitutional taking triggering the protection of
the Takings Clause. 142 The processes of taking and taxing are not analo-
gous and the two cannot be compared.
1 43
In Society for Savings v. Coite,'4 the Court also considered the consti-
tutionality of progressive taxation in dictum. It stated:
Experience shows that [tax assessed on the basis of business volume] ... is
better calculated [than fixed sums] to effect justice among the corporations
required to contribute to the public burdens than any other which has been
devised, as its tendency is to graduate the required contribution to the value
of the privileges granted, and to the extent of their exercise. Existence of the
power is beyond doubt and it rests in the discretion of the legislature whether
they will levy a fixed sum, or if not, to determine in what manner the amount
shall be ascertained.
145
137. See id. at 696.
138. See id. at 702.
139. See Massey, supra note 17, at 123 ("Every State has independent constitutional guaran-
tees against the uncompensated taking of private property for public use.... [S]tates [are] free to
assess the validity of progressive state income taxation under the state takings guarantee .....
140. See id.
141. Id.
142. Earlier, in Gilman v. City of Sheboygan, 67 U.S. 510 (1862), Justice Swayne stated:
"That clause [Takings Clause] of the Constitution refers solely to the exercise, by the State, of
the right of eminent domain." Id. at 513. Although Calvin Massey takes a dim view of Justice
Swayne, Swayne's opinions were supported by a majority of the Court at that time and should
not be discarded merely because he was perhaps weaker, in Calvin Massey's judgement, than
other justices. Perhaps the reason that the Court has not directly considered the issue since
Brushaber is that the opinion put the matter to rest.
143. Lower courts have never given much credit to the takings argument. See, e.g., United
States v. Jones, 877 F. Supp. 907, 912 (D.N.J. 1995) (noting that courts have "routinely rejected"
arguments such as taxation being a taking under the Fifth Amendment); Coleman v. Comm'r of
Internal Revenue, 791 F.2d 68, 70-72 (7th Cir. 1986) (dismissing a taxpayer's takings challenge as
"frivolous" and calling the taxpayer's claims "tired arguments").
144. 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 594 (1867).
145. Id. at 608.
Case for Progressive Taxation
At the time of this decision, the nation was experiencing its first pro-
gressive income tax.4 6 If the Court viewed progressive taxation as uncon-
stitutional, it seems unlikely that it would have offered such a spirited en-
dorsement.
If Kimball and Society for Savings left open the possibility that pro-
gressive taxation was open to question, that possibility was firmly re-
jected in Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 47 when the Court up-
held the constitutionality of a progressive income tax.' 48 The Brushaber
Court held unequivocally that Knowlton foreclosed the contention that a
progressive tax is an uncompensated taking.149 In Brushaber, the Court
explicitly decided, due to an apparent assertion by. the taxpayers that a
tax was an uncompensated taking, that the tax was not subject to the
Takings Clause based on long-standing history and precedent. The Court
wrote, "[this] proposition [that the progressive tax is an uncompensated
taking] disregards the fact that in the very early history of the Govern-
ment a progressive tax was imposed by Congress and that such authority
was exerted in some if not all of the various income taxes enacted prior to
1894 to which we have previously adverted.', 50 This reiterates an assump-
tion which is clear from the legislative history of the Sixteenth Amend-
ment: Congress's power to tax is presumptively constitutional. 5 '
Soon after Brushaber, the Court again had occasion to address a
challenge to the new income tax. In Tyree Realty Co. v. Anderson,52 a
taxpayer claimed that the income tax was invalid because of, among
other things, "the illegal discriminations and inequalities which it creates,
including the provision for a progressive tax on the income of individu-
als.. . "' Again, the Court declined to consider the points raised by the
taxpayer inasmuch as "each [of the points] and all of them were consid-
ered and adversely disposed of in Brushaber .... 154 The terse disposition
is at least mildly surprising because Brushaber had been decided in an era
when a progressive rate structure was considered radical.
The cases after Brushaber show that the Court has clearly proceeded
under the assumption that progressive taxation is constitutionally permis-
146. See supra note 5.
147. 240 U.S. 1 (1916).
148. The tax in Brushaber-the Tariff Act of 1913, 38 Stat. 166 (enacted Oct. 3, 1913), the
Income Tax of 1913-was enacted only eight months after the 36th state ratified the Sixteenth
Amendment. See WrrrE, supra note 6, at 75, 78.
149. Brushaber, 240 U.S. at 25 (1916).
150. Id.
151. See supra notes 120-128 and accompanying text.
152. 240 U.S. 115 (1916).
153. Id. at 117.
154. Id.
155. See Staudt, supra note 44, at 657.
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sible. In fact, the Court has acted consistently to protect the progressive
rate structure against erosion. The Court has decided many cases in
which taxpayers have attempted to exploit differences in tax rates among
different family members (or related entities) without questioning the dif-
ferential rates themselves."' In Lucas v. Earl,5 7 for example, an agree-
ment between a husband and wife was held ineffective to attribute half of
the husband's income (taxed at a high rate) to the wife (who would have
been taxed at a much lower rate) .' The court tacitly accepted the consti-
tutionality of progression in the tax rates and focused instead on the
process by which the taxpayer attempted to exploit the tax rate differen-
tial.159 In Lucas and in other income splitting cases, the Court effectively
protected progressive rate structures by limiting the circumstances under
which a taxpayer can attribute his or her income to another.
It follows that, as a general proposition, the Supreme Court is hesitant
to tread on Congress's broad power to tax.'6 The Court's deference to
government in matters relating to taxation derives from government's
dependence upon taxes to function. The "presumption of constitutional-
ity" of any economic regulatory legislation passed by Congress restrains
the Court in these circumstances."' The conclusion is inescapable that the
Court consistently allows the government wide latitude with regard to
taxation, certainly sufficient to permit progressive taxation.
C. Limits on Taxation
Although the Court has rejected the notion that takings jurisprudence
applies in the area of taxation, it has struck down taxes (albeit rarely) un-
der other doctrines. Progressive taxation, however, is immune to all of
them. The purpose of this section is to demonstrate the lengths to which
the Court is willing to go to uphold taxes, as well as the reasons why it
156. See Blum & Kalven, supra note 11, at 431.
157. 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
158. See id. at 114-15.
159. See id. Blum and Kalven pointed out that Lucas v. Earl and the other "income splitting
cases" were the result of progressive tax rates. Blum & Kalven, supra note 11, at 431.
160. See, e.g., United States v. Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 713, 733 (1985) (affirming
I.R.S.'s right to levy against entire balance of joint bank accounts of delinquent taxpayer);
United States v. Rodgers, 461 U.S. 677, 697 U.S. (1983) (upholding the government right to sell
the entire property of a delinquent taxpayer despite the property interests of innocent third par-
ties); G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 352 (1977) (rejecting Fourth Amend-
ment challenge to seizure of taxpayer's property in lieu of taxes); Phillips v. Commissioner, 283
U.S. 589, 595-96 (1931) (affirming revenue collection by summary proceeding).
161. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). "Famous
footnote four" written by Justice Stone went on to intimate that the presumption of constitution-
ality of economic legislation would be subjected to "more exacting judicial scrutiny" only in in-
stances where the Constitution specifically prohibited such legislation such as restricting voting
rights, freedom of expression, or political association. Id.
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does so.
Calvin Massey's concern regarding the tyranny of taxation is neither
trivial nor unique; the Court has also recognized that the power to tax
should not be unfettered. For example, the Loan Ass'n v. Topeka'62 Court
seemed aware of and genuinely afraid of the government's taxation
power and the resulting ability to wreak havoc upon citizens.' As the
Court explained, the power to tax "can as readily be employed against
one class of individuals and in favor of another, so as to ruin the one class
and give unlimited wealth and prosperity to the other, if there is no im-
plied limitation of the uses for which the power may be exercised."' 64 The
Topeka Court recognized that a legitimate tax must strike the uneasy
balance between providing the needed financial support of the govern-
ment and being "sanctioned by time and the acquiescence of the peo-
ple.' ' 165 This uneasy balance allows taxation powers to be circumscribed
under narrow circumstances.
Brushaber v. Union Pacific Railroad Co.'66 takes the classic approach,
warning that a tax might fail if it were "so arbitrary as to constrain to the
conclusion that it was not the exertion of taxation but a confiscation of
property, that is, a taking of the same in violation of the Fifth Amend-
ment.' 67 While Brushaber suggests that the Takings Clause might apply
to arbitrary and confiscatory taxes-which the Court has struck down
consistently-it also makes clear that progressivity, in and of itself, does
not invalidate a tax under the Takings Clause. Only taxes that are, in sub-
stance, criminal punishments might fall within the Takings Clause.'6
Brushaber is thus consistent with the idea that exactions that are exer-
cises of the revenue function will pass constitutional muster. The propor-
tionality or progressivity of a tax does not determine whether the tax is
unconstitutionally confiscatory ("harsh or oppressive" in modem par-
162. 87 U.S. 655 (1874).
163. See id. at 662.
164. Id. at 664.
165. Id. at 665.
166. 240 U.S. 1 (1916).
167. Id. at 24-25 (1916). This same thought is articulated by the Court in any number of its
tax opinions. "[Wihen the question is whether a tax imposed by a State deprives a party of rights
secured by the Federal Constitution ... [w]e must regard the substance, rather than the form,
and the controlling test is to be found in the operation and effect of the law as applied and en-
forced by the State." Lunding v. New York Tax Appeals Tribunal, 522 U.S. 287, 297 (1998)
(quoting St. Louis Southwestern R.R. Co. v. Arkansas, 235 U.S. 350, 362 (1914)). Where Equal
Protection is concerned, "inequalities that result not from hostile discrimination, but occasionally
and incidentally in the application of a [tax] system that is not arbitrary in its classification, are
not sufficient to defeat the law." Id. (quoting Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U.S. 525, 543 (1919)).
168. See Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 781-82 (1994) (striking
down a so-called tax as being essentially punishment); Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation
Co., 370 U.S. 1, 7 (1962) (invalidating an exaction "merely in 'the guise of a tax"').
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lance). As a practical matter, this disposes of Calvin Massey's position.
Still, it is worth probing further the contours of limits on the taxing
power.
The modern view holds that a tax can be found invalid if it is not for a
public purpose, if it serves a deterrent purpose seeking to completely bar
an activity, if it is used exclusively to punish, or if it is harsh and oppres-
sive. 1 69 Equal Protection and First Amendment concerns can also bring a
tax into question.7 A short discussion of these issues reveals that, even in
the face of these articulated limitations, the Court is still hesitant to de-
clare a tax unconstitutional unless it is a gross abuse of the power to tax.
1. Public Purpose
A basic theme of tax policy holds that taxes must be levied for a pub-
lic purpose.1 7 ' The public is taxed "to raise money for public purposes"
and not to support the private needs of individuals.'72 Thus, initially, the
validity of a tax should be tested by determining who benefits from the
tax and whether the tax was implemented with proper authority. 173
Alexander Hamilton observed that "[t]he genius of liberty reprobates
every thing arbitrary or discretionary in taxation, 1 4 but the Court has
nonetheless used its discretion to eliminate unconstitutional taxes. The
Court's restraint of the government's taxation power appears to have had
its genesis in Loan Ass'n v. Topeka.' In Topeka, the Court angrily struck
down a tax imposed to pay for bonds "donated" to private industry with-
out corresponding public benefit, characterizing such taxation as tanta-
mount to "robbery., 176 The Court held that one of the limitations on taxa-
tion powers is that taxes must be levied for public benefit rather than
designed merely to funnel tax dollars to corporations.
177
More recent cases suggest that the public benefit requirement of
Topeka has diminished and that the government retains broad discretion
169. This framework is more fully described in an earlier work. See generally Leo P. Mar-
tinez, Of Fairness and Might: The Limits of the Sovereign Power To Tax After Winstar, 28 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 1193 (1996). For the reader's convenience, I summarize the relevant portions of that
piece.
170. See supra text accompanying notes 201-238.
171. Hence Calvin Massey's devotion of time to argue the use of "benefits" theory to under-
cut progressive taxation. See Massey, supra note 17, at 106-08.
172. Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. 655,664 (1874).
173. See id. at 665.
174. Alexander Hamilton, The Continentalist, No. 6, 1782, in 3 PAPERS OF ALEXANDER
HAMILTON 104 (Harold C. Syrett ed., 1962).
175. 87 U.S. 655 (1874).
176. Id. at 664. Of course, Topeka preceded our notion of the modem welfare state.
177. See id. at 663-64.
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to enact different types of taxes to ensure its survival. 178 Progressive taxa-
tion meets the test requiring that it be levied for a public purpose. It is
imposed on every member of the public for the common good, including
such functions as national defense and social welfare programs.179 It is not
imposed to benefit any private enterprise or to "build up private for-
tunes."l1 °
2. Deterrent Taxes
A tax that deters an activity will be upheld unless deterrence is its ex-
clusive purpose. A tax cannot be used to bar an activity, but taxes that
discourage or make an activity difficult or expensive have been upheld by
the Court. 8' In deference to the taxing authority, the Court will often
search for means to label a tax as a "revenue generation" operation,
thereby making deterrence merely a side effect of the tax.'
According to the Court, legitimate taxes "generate revenues, impose
fiscal burdens on individuals, and deter certain behavior."'1 83 The amount
of a tax does not appear to be a factor which the Court chooses to focus
on-sometimes even if an excessive amount demonstrates a deterrent
purpose. In fact, the Court has expressed the idea that even a tax with a
particularly steep rate or an "obvious deterrent purpose" does not neces-
sarily evince an inappropriate use of the power to tax. 8' So long as reve-
178. In Everson v. Board of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1 (1947), the Court explained that
Topeka was simply one of the "rare instances" in which the Court struck down a tax on such
grounds, a "far reaching authority [which] must be exercised with the most extreme caution.
Otherwise, a state's power to legislate for the public welfare might be seriously curtailed ....
Changing local conditions... may lead a state.., to believe that laws.., are necessary to pro-
mote the general well-being of the people." Id. at 6-7; see also Regan v. Taxation With Repre-
sentation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 547 (1983) ("[L]egislatures have especially broad latitude
in creating classifications and distinctions in tax statutes.").
179. Progressive taxation is itself a kind of welfare program. See Bankman & Griffith, supra
note 33, at 1945-67 (citing distributive justice as a goal of progressive taxation).
180. Topeka, 87 U.S. at 664 (1874).
181. See, e.g., Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513 (1937).
182. According to dissenting Chief Justice Rehnquist, "taxes are customarily enacted to
raise revenue to support the costs of government" but also "may be enacted to deter or even
suppress the taxed activity." Department of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 787
(1994) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 778.
184. Id. at 780. In Kurth Ranch, the Court struck down a Montana drug tax statute that im-
posed a tax on the possession and storage of dangerous drugs after defendants were arrested on
drug charges. See id. at 784. The Department of Revenue attempted to collect almost $900,000 in
taxes from the Kurths, independent of any criminal penalties. See id. at 773. The Court found the
Montana statute unconstitutional because it placed the Kurths "in jeopardy a second time 'for
the same offense."' Id. at 784. This was the first time the Supreme Court held that a tax violates
the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution. See id. at 780-81 (citing U.S. CONST. amend. V).
Notably, the tax liability in Kurth Ranch was nearly eight times the value of the marijuana
seized, obviously a deterrent tax, yet this was not the basis for the statute's unconstitutionality.
See 511 U.S. at 767.
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nue generation can be labeled as the main purpose for the tax, the high
rate and the deterrent effect will likely be disregarded.
Although progressive taxation features steeper rates at higher in-
comes, nobody seriously argues that these rates were enacted specifically
to deter individuals from generating additional gross income."' Revenue
generation is clearly the purpose of the general income tax. The limita-
tions on deterrent taxes simply do not apply to progressive taxation.
3. Punitive Taxes
Legislatures cannot use tax laws as tools to inflict punishment or as-
sess penalties. A tax imposed with punishment as the obvious goal will
likely be found to be an abuse of the legislature's taxing authority. Taxes
with punitive characteristics are closely scrutinized by the Court, which
has evidenced reluctance to allow a punitive tax to pass constitutional
muster.
A punitive tax was ruled unconstitutional in Department of Revenue v.
Kurth Ranch."" In Kurth Ranch, the Court struck down a drug tax be-
cause it was "imposed on criminals and no others, [and] depart[ed] far
from normal revenue laws as to become a form of punishment.' ' 187 Thus,
when taxes become punitive the Court will not allow them to be imposed:
"'[T]here comes a time in the extension of the penalizing features of the
so-called tax when it loses its character as such and becomes a mere pen-
alty with the characteristics of regulation and punishment."'
1 8
"[J]ustifications [for such a tax] vanish when the activity is completely
forbidden, for the legitimate revenue-raising purpose that might support
such a tax could be equally well served by increasing the fine imposed
upon conviction. 1 8 9 Under the Kurth formulation, a tax is also inappro-
185. It could be suggested that progressive income taxes deter higher-income individuals
from working beyond a marginal point, and that the progressive rates are a deterrent to work.
However, taxes that suppress certain activities have been upheld by the Court, for every tax in
some way regulates an activity and "[t]o some extent... interposes an economic impediment to
the activity taxed as compared with others not taxed." Sonzinsky, 300 U.S. at 513 (1937).
186. 511 U.S. 767 (1994).
187. Id. at 784. That the tax was labeled civil rather than criminal was of no moment: a tax
subsequent and in addition to criminal penalties is inappropriate if its purpose "may not fairly be
characterized as remedial, but only as a deterrent or retribution." Id. at 777 (citing United States
v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 448-49 (1989)).
188. Id. at 780 (quoting Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20, 38 (1922)). The proposition that
taxes are inappropriate if used as penalties is in accord with the opinion of some scholars who
assert that "one is obligated to pay only those taxes that are not penal in nature," i.e., imposed
for the commission or omission of an act. See Robert W. McGee, Is Tax Evasion Unethical?, 42
KAN. L. REV. 411, 417 (1994) (citing REV. MARTIN T. CROWE, THE MORAL OBLIGATION OF
PAYING JUST TAXES, DISSERTATION, THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY OF AMERICA STUDIES IN
SACRED THEOLOGY NO. 84, at 75 (1944)).
189. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 782; see also id. at 791 (Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting); id. at 792-
794 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (stating that "the power to tax illegal activity carries with it the
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priately punitive if it serves an apparent purpose that is "arbitrary" or
"shocking. '"' 90 Progressive taxation, however, exists to apportion the tax
burden among those who are able to pay, and it is not designed to punish
taxpayers, even high-income taxpayers.191
Kurth relied heavily on the ideas expressed in United States v.
Halper, a case decided in 1989 that set out a test for determining
whether a sanction is punitive. In 1997, in Hudson v. United States, 93 the
Court abrogated Halper on the basis that the Halper test "has proved
unworkable" by placing too much emphasis on the deterrent effect of the
sanction.' 94 With part of Kurth's underpinning seemingly eroded, the pos-
sibility that a punitive effect of a particular progressive will render the tax
improper becomes even more remote.
4. Harsh and Oppressive Taxes
A tax law that operates in a harsh or oppressive manner toward indi-
viduals or groups of individuals also lacks legitimate authority. Although
progressive taxation, in theory, could become confiscatory if an ultra-
steep rate were imposed on a few individuals, 95 the Court has often trav-
eled some distance to uphold a tax that at first glance appeared to be
harsh and oppressive.
For example, a retroactively applied tax could be seen as harsh and
oppressive. However, the Court upheld such a tax in United States v.
Carlton.196 In Carlton, the executor of an estate engaged in a transaction
resulting in over a half-million dollar loss in order to take advantage of an
estate tax deduction. The IRS disallowed the deduction, based on a re-
danger that the legislature will use the tax to punish the participants for engaging in that activ-
ity," and "a civil sanction will be considered punishment to the extent that it serves only the pur-
poses of retribution and deterrence, as opposed to furthering any nonpunitive objective").
190. Id. at 791 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). In its articulation of the constitutional standard,
the Kurth Ranch Court employs an "arbitrary" or "shocking" standard that is arguably the
equivalent to that of Carlton's "arbitrary or irrational" and "harsh and oppressive" standard. See
United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26 (1994).
191. The progressivity of the federal estate and gift tax is intended to deter taxpayers from
amassing great wealth, thereby discouraging undesirable economic stratification. See Hudson,
supra note 27 at 27 (1983) (citing S. REP. No. 144-97 at 124, reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 105,
226). For a more provocative stance, see Mark L. Ascher, Curtailing Inherited Wealth, 89 MICH.
L. REv. 69 (1990) (advocating, essentially, a 100 percent rate of taxation on wealth transfers).
192. 490 U.S. 435 (1989).
193. 522 U.S. 93, 118 S. Ct. 488 (1997).
194. See id. at 494.
195. See Massey, supra note 17, at 104-105 (arguing that a 100 percent tax imposed on Bill
Gates would be subject to the Takings Clause). Such a tax would be invalidated as "harsh and
oppressive" under established case law rather than struck using the Takings Clause. Although
the effect is the same, the Court appears comfortable with the "harsh and oppressive" approach
and has already held that the Takings Clause has no application in taxation questions.
196. 512 U.S. 26 (1994).
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cent tax law amendment that retroactively eliminated the deduction. The
Court rejected Carlton's claim of reliance and detriment and upheld the
retroactive tax as constitutional.9 The Court contended that because
taxes are within the "sphere of economic policy," the "harsh and oppres-
sive" test for the validity of retroactive tax legislation is the same as the
"arbitrary and irrational" test generally applicable to economic legisla-
tion.9 A retroactive tax will be upheld, like any other retroactive eco-
nomic legislation, if it "is supported by a legitimate legislative purpose
furthered by rational means.'99
There is a distinction to be drawn between unconstitutionally confis-
catory (read "harsh and oppressive") tax rates and differential taxation.
Calvin Massey's vision seems to blend these ideas. He claims that
"[s]urely an income tax of 100% imposed on a single individual-for ex-
ample, Bill Gates-[is subject to the Takings Clause, so] why does the
problem disappear when the [tax] applies to the 2.5 million highest in-
come earners in the nation? ' ,200 While a confiscatory progressive tax may
be subject to attack, even a proportional tax might be subject to a claim
that it borders on the unconstitutionally confiscatory. The fact that a tax
happens to be confiscatory does not mean that a proportional or "flat"
tax is necessarily favored.
5. Equal Protection
The Court has not overlooked the possibility that taxation might lead
to violations of the Equal Protection Clause. However, the Court has
shown difficulty developing clear indicators of an equal protection viola-
tion. The need for broad powers of taxation, as well as the impracticality
of exacting the same contribution from every individual, has led the
Court to narrow its use of the Equal Protection Clause when considering
taxation. The Court has felt safe to strike a tax for equal protection rea-
sons only when legislatures tax similarly situated entities differently. The
cases follow a predictable pattern. Those cases that provide relief against
201a tax scheme are those in which horizontal equity is violated. On the
other hand, cases involving issues of vertical equity usually are decided in
favor of the government.'22
197. See id. at 34-35.
198. Id. at 30. Courts also "defer to legislative judgment as to the necessity and reasonable-
ness of [the] particular measure." United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 23 (1977)
(citing East New York Savings Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230 (1945)).
199. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717, 729 (1984).
200. Massey, supra note 17, at 104-105.
201. See, e.g., Lunding v. New York Tax Appeals Tribunal, 522 U.S. 287, 296 (1998); Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S. 869, 881-83 (1985).
202. See, e.g., General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 298-300 (1997); Magoun v. Illi-
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Notwithstanding the notion that fairness and equity limit the power to
tax, the Court has made it clear that differential taxation schemes are not
unconstitutional. Despite the existence of tax rate differentials, progres-
sive tax schemes have survived in the cases that have considered vertical
equity as the prime issue. 3 These cases contain explicit pronouncements
that a progressive tax does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution. The Court has upheld differential taxation schemes as con-
stitutional, stating, "[a] tax which affects the property within a specific
class is uniform as to the class, and there is no provision of the constitu-
tion which precludes legislative action from assessing a tax on that par-
ticular class. 
'204
In Brushaber, the Court rejected the contention that the tax at issue
violated substantive due process by differentiating between the powers of
taxation and the limits of due process. Chief Justice White wrote that "it
is... well settled" that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
is not a limitation upon the taxing power conferred upon Congress by the
Constitution; ... the Constitution does not conflict with itself by conferring
upon the one hand a taxing power and taking the same power away on the
other by the limitations of the due process clause. 205
The same antipathy to limiting taxation powers is seen in Lunding v.
New York Tax Appeals Tribunal,1 in which the Court used a test derived
in New Hampshire v. Piper207 to strike a New York income tax which dis-
allowed nonresidents a deduction for alimony.2 °s In striking down the tax
scheme, the Court stated that the Privileges & Immunities Clause 2"9
"[a]ffords no assurance of precise equality in taxation between residents
and nonresidents of a particular State.2 20 However, the Court stated that
the New York tax did not meet the burden of proving that "[(i)] there is a
substantial reason for the difference in treatment; and (ii) the discrimina-
nois Trust & Sav. Bank, 170 U.S. 283, 311-12 (1898).
203. See, e.g., Magoun, 170 U.S. at 300-01. An Illinois inheritance statute set up three classi-
fications of persons who were differentially taxed. See id. at 285. The statute classed heirs and
devisees into three tax classes based upon their blood relationship to the decedent; close rela-
tives, more distant relatives, and "strangers to the blood" of the decedent. See id. at 286. The
rates were progressive among the categories. The statute also treated one classification differ-
ently based upon the amount of inheritance. See id. at 285-286. The "stranger-to-the-blood"
class was progressively taxed based upon the value of the inheritance. See id. The rates pro-
gressed from three dollars per one hundred dollars of inheritance on amounts under ten thou-
sand dollars up to six dollars per one hundred dollars of inheritance if the amount exceeded fifty
thousand dollars. See id.
204. Id. at 297.
205. Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 24 (1916).
206. 522 U.S. 287 (1998).
207. 470 U.S. 274 (1984).
208. See Lunding, 522 U.S. at 298 (citing New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 284 (1984)).
209. U.S. CONST. art. XIV, § 1.
210. Lunding, 522 U.S. at 297.
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tion practiced against nonresidents bears a substantial relationship to the
State's objective."2"' Again, a successful challenge was predicated upon
horizontal equity, the different treatment of similarly situated taxpayers.
Not all such cases raise the bar as high. For example, in General Mo-
tors Corp. v. Tracy,12 an Ohio tax that exempted natural gas local distri-
bution companies (LDC's) from sales and use taxes was held not to vio-
late the Equal Protection Clause. " In denying General Motors, a buyer
of out-of-state natural gas, tax relief based upon an Equal Protection
claim, the Court stated that "[s]tate tax classifications require only a ra-
tional basis to satisfy the Equal Protection Clause. 2 14 The Court flatly
upheld the power to tax differentially. "[I]n taxation, even more than in
other fields, legislatures possess the greatest freedom in classification., 215
216Nordlinger v. Hahn, in which the Court assessed the constitutional-
ity of a California property tax scheme that created dramatic disparities
between taxpayers owning relatively similar properties, represents the
zenith of the power to tax. Through this acquisition value assessment
scheme, a long-time homeowner's property tax was based on an essen-
tially frozen 1975-76 tax year value, with an inflationary cap not to exceed
2%.217 The Court noted that Nordlinger, as a 1989 purchaser of a
"modest" Los Angeles home worth $170,000, had a "general tax levied
against her modest home.., only a few dollars short of that paid by a
pre-1976 owner of a $2.1 million Malibu beach front home., 218 In view of
such disparity, Nordlinger claimed California's tax scheme violated the
Equal Protection clause in that such a tax was "arbitrary or irrational."2 9
After analyzing California's scheme of property taxation that explic-
itly favored long-time homeowners, the Nordlinger Court recognized that
taxes may reflect a state's belief that one taxpayer's expectations are
"more deserving of protection" than those of another taxpayer. 2'0 Re-
markably, both the Nordlinger dissent and majority explicitly conceded
that this system of taxation is discriminatory and unfair. Justice Stevens,
in his dissent, referred to California long-time homeowners as "squires"
and said such tax law creates "a privilege of a medieval character: Two
families with equal needs and equal resources are treated differently
211. Id. at 298.
212. 519 U.S. 278 (1997).
213. See id. at 282-83, 312.
214. Id. at 311 (citations omitted).
215. Id. at 311 (quoting Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940)).
216. 505 U.S. 1 (1992).
217. See id. at 5 (citing CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA).
218. Id. at 7.
219. Id. at 11.
220. Id. at 13.
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solely because of their different heritage. '' 2 ' But the majority refused to
invalidate the tax even though it characterized it as a "grand experiment
[that] appears to vest benefits in a broad, powerful, and entrenched seg-
ment of society, and... ordinary democratic processes may be unlikely to
prompt its consideration or repeal.
22
By allowing the tax, which it described as discriminatory and unfair, it
appears that the Court merely pays lip service to its earlier warning of
dire consequences from taxes that transfer wealth from one class to an-
other.223 When it comes to taxes, the Court will not "second-guess[] state
tax officials., 224 Even in cases of multiple taxation, the rights of taxpayer
citizens must yield to "tax uniformity" and "state autonomy. '' 221 If the
Court is willing to endorse even cases of multiple taxation, it is fairly
clear that it will uphold progressive taxation as a valid exercise of the
sovereign's powers.
By contrast, taxpayers who have challenged tax schemes on horizon-
tal equity grounds have fared much better. In Metropolitan Life Insur-
ance Co. v. Ward,"' an Alabama statute that imposed dramatically differ-
ent tax premiums on domestic and out-of-state insurance companies was
challenged on equal protection grounds.227 The gross disparity in tax pre-
miums among similarly situated taxpayers, an attempt by Alabama to
bolster the creation of domestic insurance companies within the state,
221. Id. at 29-30 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
222. Id. at 18.
223. See Loan Ass'n. v. Topeka, 87 U.S. 655, 664 (1874) (warning that the taxation power
"can readily be employed against one class of individuals and in favor of another, so as to ruin
the one class and give unlimited wealth and prosperity to the other").
224. Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 25 (Thomas, J., concurring). Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise
Tax Board of California, 512 U.S. 298 (1994), is also consistent with the Court's reluctance to
substitute its judgment as to tax officials' views of the limits of taxation power. In Barclays, the
Court upheld California's imposition of a franchise tax using a "worldwide combined reporting"
method. See id. at 303-04. Corporations operating in California were required to aggregate the
income of their parent corporations, affiliates, and subsidiaries, including entities operating in
other states and foreign countries. The state then taxed a percentage of the worldwide income
equal to the average proportion of worldwide payroll, property, and sales in California. See id. at
304-05 (citing CAL REV. & TAX. § 25128 (West 1992)). Once the average percentage was deter-
mined, that percentage of the total income of the large corporate entity as a whole would
determine the tax liability for the subsidiary. For example, in the first of the consolidated cases,
the state used the income of Barclays Group, a multinational banking enterprise composed of
over 220 corporations, to determine the tax liability for two independent members operating in
California. The state found that the two members were part of a "worldwide unitary business,"
and assessed them approximately $153,000 in additional tax liability. See id. at 308. Although
petitioners pointed out and the Court acknowledged that upholding the state's power to tax
meant that some taxpayers were at risk for or would be subject to "multiple international taxa-
tion," the Court was still willing to uphold the tax as an inherent state power. See id. at 317-20.
225. Id. at 330-31.
226. 470 U.S. 869 (1985).
227. See id. at 871.
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was viewed dramatically differently by opposing members of the Court.228
Still, even those few cases that hold a tax unconstitutional demon-
strate the extreme reluctance to intrude into governments' power to tax
despite obvious circumstances of inequity and oppression. Although the
tax in Metropolitan Life was held unconstitutional because of the dis-
crimination against the foreign corporations and Equal Protection viola-
tions, a strong dissent by four of the justices criticized the majority's deci-
sion as "astonishing" and "unsupportable by precedent., 219 In her dissent,
Justice O'Connor contradicted the majority's opinion with a discussion
that "long established jurisprudence" required the Court to defer to the
judgment of the legislature so long as the classification for the differential
tax was "rationally related to a legitimate state purpose., 230 Remarkably,
the strength of the taxing power led four members of the Court to uphold
the power of the sovereign, notwithstanding stark equal protection con-
cerns.
In theory, progressive taxation cannot violate horizontal equity be-
cause all similarly situated taxpayers are treated equally. At the same
time, a progressive tax treats dissimilarly situated taxpayers differently.
Thus, objections that progressive taxation does not treat people equally
are sound. However, the Court will not use the Equal Protection Clause
to strike a progressive tax unless it somehow results in a violation of hori-
zontal equity.
Calvin Massey's challenge essentially questions the validity of vertical
equity as a goal and progressive taxation as a means by which to achieve
it. He frames his arguments, however, in the guise of horizontal equity,
that is, equal treatment of similarly situated taxpayers. The difficulty with
his position is that while the Court has, albeit reluctantly, afforded some
relief for violations of the principle of horizontal equity, it has been
loathe to use Equal Protection doctrine to disallow taxes that seek to
achieve vertical equity. Simply, the Court allows taxation schemes to
treat differently situated taxpayers differently. The cited cases demon-
strate that the Court is forced to repel any challenge to government dis-
cretion to tax, especially where the challenge focuses on economic dis-
parity.
228. See id. at 882-83. The domestic companies in Metropolitan Life were paying a tax pre-
mium of only one percent on all types of insurance, while the foreign companies were charged a
rate of three percent on gross life insurance premiums received within the state and four percent
on other types of insurance. See id. at 871.
229. Id. at 883 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
230. Id. at 884 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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6. First Amendment Concerns
The use of constitutional doctrine apart from takings jurisprudence
has not been fruitful for the taxpayer seeking to invalidate taxing
schemes. Taxpayers have succeeded only in those situations where an af-
firmative constitutional right is directly implicated. For example, the First
Amendment can, in some circumstances, override the taxing power. In
231Arkansas Writers Project, Inc. v. Ragland, for example, the Supreme
Court held that an Arkansas sales tax on general interest magazines,
which exempted magazines classified as religious, professional, trade, or
sports journals, violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments.232 The
result is consistent with the theme of guarding against violations of
horizontal equity inasmuch as similarly situated taxpayers are treated dif-
ferently. The single medium of magazines is subject to different rates of
taxation based on content.
Where the "discrimination" in taxation is not content-based, however,
the Court allows relatively constraint-free taxation, even when a funda-
mental right such as freedom of speech is at stake. In Leathers v. Med-
lock,233 the Court upheld the government's relatively unlimited ability to
differentially tax. An Arkansas sales tax on cable television, with an ex-
emption for other media such as newspapers, was found not to violate the
First Amendment because the tax was not aimed at the cable company's
First Amendment activities and the tax was not content-based. Assert-
ing that the legislature has "especially broad latitude" when it comes to
the creation of tax classifications, the Court stated: "Inherent in the
power to tax is the power to discriminate in taxation.,
235
This pattern replicates that found in the equal protection context.
While there is a demonstrable tendency of the Court to protect the prin-
ciple of horizontal equity (that is, similarly situated taxpayers should be
treated equally), there is nonetheless the reality that taxpayers making
challenges to the vertical equity of taxation schemes do not receive the
same protection. By contrast, where the goal of horizontal equity is not
met, the Court has been quick to invalidate a tax, resorting to the dor-
231. 481 U.S. 221 (1987).
232. See id. at 229. "[Tlhe basis on which [the Arkansas tax] differentiates between maga-
zines is particularly repugnant to First Amendment principles: a magazine's tax status depends
entirely on its content." Id.
233. 499 U.S. 439 (1991).
234. See id. at 444.
235. Id. at 451. However, see Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm 'r. of
Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 579 (1983), in which the Court held that the "use tax" on the cost of pa-
per and ink products enacted by Minnesota violated the First Amendment because it singled out
the press as a whole and because it provided exemptions to a small group of newspapers in par-
ticular. The Court feared that to vest this type of power in the state would allow it indirectly to
regulate and suppress the press. See id. at 585; Ragland, 481 U.S. at 221.
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mant commerce clause 26 or to the supremacy clause.
The resolution of conflicts involving the power to tax and some af-
firmative right (such as First Amendment rights) not so closely associated
with the mechanics of the taxing power (such as the Fifth Amendment
takings provision) harmonize with an unfettered power to tax.13' The ex-
treme reluctance to second-guess the taxing authorities apparent in
Nordlinger, supported by language in the other cases, reveals the Court's
support for the proposition that taxes play a vital role in the existence
and functioning of government. For the sake of preserving this vital
power to tax and the government's financial well-being, the Court ap-
pears willing to defer to sovereign taxation powers and to sacrifice tax-
payer conceptions of fairness, even if this means allowing the government
to shift its tax burdens and benefits in ways that appear discriminatory
and unfair. The theme of deference to legislative power is a constant. It
carries through the Court's opinions on all tax matters, and it would carry
through in a takings challenge to progressive taxation.
7. Conclusion
Calvin Massey's analysis of Brushaber and his assertion that progres-
sive taxation is a denial of equal protection are both misplaced. In his
analysis of Brushaber, he claims that one sentence of the opinion shows
that the Fifth Amendment controls the taxing power and that the Takings
Clause could be used to invalidate a tax. 39 The sentence reads:
And no change in the situation here would arise even if it be conceded, as we
think it must be that this doctrine would have no application in a case where,
although there was a seeming exercise of the taxing power, the act com-
plained of was so arbitrary as to constrain to the conclusion that it was not the
exertion of taxation but a confiscation of property; that is, a taking of the
236. See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 575-583,
595 (1997) (invalidating a tax exemption for charitable institutions operated principally for the
benefit of the residents of Maine as discriminatory against charitable institutions that mostly
benefit nonresidents); Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325, 330-33, 346-47 (1996) (invalidating
North Carolina's "intangibles tax" differentially taxing residents based upon the percentage of
taxable income derived in state by a corporation in which the taxpayer holds stock); Assoc'd In-
dus. of Missouri v. Lohman, 511 U.S. 641, 647-54 (1994) (invalidating a Missouri "use" tax on
property stored, used or consumed in state but purchased out of state because the property was
exempt from state sales tax); Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality of the
State of Oregon, 511 U.S. 93, 108 (1994) (invalidating an Oregon surcharge that charged a higher
per ton rate on solid waste dumped in state if generated out of state).
237. See, e.g., Davis v. Michigan Dep't of the Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 815-17 (1989)
(invalidating a Michigan tax that exempted recipients of state and local retirement income from
state income tax but not recipients of federal retirement incomes); Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v.
Garner, 459 U.S. 392, 397-99 (1983) (invalidating a Tennessee bank tax that taxed income de-
rived from interest on U.S. securities but exempted interest income derived from state and local
securities).
238. See, e.g., Chapman v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 613 F.2d 193, 197 n.2 (9th Cir. 1979).
239. See Massey, supra note 17, at 101.
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same in violation of the Fifth Amendment ....240
Although cryptically written, the sentence more likely suggests that,
like the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Takings Clause
does not apply to an ordinary progressive income tax. This statement in-
stead is consistent and, for my purposes, coextensive with the "harsh or
oppressive" limitation on the power to tax, progressively or otherwise.241
The sentence adds nothing to the current landscape of tax limitation ju-
risprudence and seems a slender reed upon which to support a "takings"-
inspired attack on progressive taxation.
Even if Calvin Massey could support his contention that Brushaber is
ambiguous, the Tyree Realty Co. Court clearly saw, as I do, that Brusha-
ber intended to dispose of the argument that progressive taxation is un-
constitutional. If the Court intended to open the door to attacks on pro-
gressive taxation in Brushaber, it is surprising that, in all the subsequent
opportunities presented, it has not followed that path. It strains credulity
to believe that, if Brushaber did not foreclose the inquiry, the Court
would so repeatedly protect the unconstitutional.
IV. IF IT AIN'T BROKE, DON'T FIX IT
The preceding has demonstrated that Calvin Massey's core proposi-
tion is wrong. The Supreme Court has explicitly considered the constitu-
tionality of progressive taxation in the context of the Takings Clause, the
First Amendment, the Due Process Clause, and the Equal Protection
Clause, and in each instance the Court has shown that progressivity in
and of itself is not constitutionally infirm.
This Part refutes Massey's attack on benefits theory and sacrifice the-
ory to discredit progressive taxation. It also illustrates that pragmatism
must inform the debate. The result is a jurisprudential approach to taxa-
tion that results in extreme deference to legislative decision-making.
Finally, it shows that many of Massey's reasons for supporting propor-
tional taxation fall prey to the same criticisms that he levies against pro-
gressive taxation.
A. Benefits Theory/Sacrifice Theory
Massey believes that support for progressive taxation relies on a
bankrupt "benefits theory"-which states that the benefit derived from
government is, or should be, equivalent to the value of the taking. 42 For
240. Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1916).
241. See supra notes 166 -167 and accompanying text.
242. See Massey, supra note 17, at 105-06.
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similar reasons, he attacks "sacrifice theory"-the basic assumption that
money has declining marginal utility with increasing wealth.2 43 However,
neither set of arguments supports his position to the extent he claims.
According to Massey, benefits theory cannot justify progressive taxa-
tion unless the benefits derived from government are ever-increasing
along with the tax burden-a proposition that he finds indefensible. 2
However, Massey's application of benefits theory to progressive taxation
is inapt because it ignores any legitimate government role in the redistri-
241bution of wealth or in the allocation of resources.
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that there may be legitimate
and rational policy reasons to deny one taxpayer a tax-connected benefit
in favor of another taxpayer, including "local neighborhood preservation,
community, and stability. 2 46 For example, the Court in Loan Ass'n v.
Topeka247 acknowledged that the power to tax for lawful purposes should
be unlimited.2  Such unrestrained power to tax was justifiable according
to the Court, because "in most instances ... [such as for] the support of
the government, the prosecution of war, the National defence, any limita-
tion is unsafe. The entire resources of the people should in some in-
stances be at the disposal of the government., 249 The same logic applied
in Knowlton, where the progressivity of the estate tax was upheld with
the further observation that "it transgresses no express limitation in the
Constitution.
250
The second reason benefits theory does not work in the context of
progressive taxation is because the "return" to the taxpayer is, at best,
2511difficult to measure. Progressive theorists are the first to concede that
precise equality in taxation is as elusive as it is desirable.252 If the return to
243. See id. at 107-10.
244. See id. at 106-07. Epstein's approach likewise examines whether progressive income
taxation satisfies the public use requirement by providing in-kind compensation. See EPSTEIN,
supra note 13, at 283-85, 295-305. Because wealth is accumulated by the government through
taxes and distributed to individuals through services from the government, and because each
member of the public is not provided equivalent in-kind compensation for the tax dollars that
have been "taken" from them, the public use requirement is not met. See id. at 308.
245. See Joel Slemrod, Introduction to TAX PROGRESSIVITY AND INCOME INEQUALITY 2
(Joel Slemrod ed., Cambridge University Press 1994).
246. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 12 (1992) (citing Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S.
365 (1926)).
247. 87 U.S. (20 Wall) 655 (1874).
248. See id. at 663.
249. Id.
250. Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 109 (1900).
251. See Dane v. Jackson, 256 U.S. 589, 598 (1921) ("[T]he system of taxation has not yet
been devised which will return precisely the same measure of benefit to each taxpayer or class of
taxpayers ...."); Tappan v. Merchants' Nat'l Bank, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 490, 504 (1873)
("Absolute equality in taxation can never be attained."); Slemrod, supra note 245, at 2.
252. See Tappan v. Merchants' Nat'l Bank, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 490, 502-04 (1873).
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the taxpayer is elusive, little headway can be made in undercutting pro-
gressive taxation on the basis of benefits theory.
Massey's argument against benefits theory is further misleading be-
cause most supporters of progressive taxation do not rely on benefits the-
ory to defend progressivity.253 Nonetheless, if one is inclined to rely on
benefits theory to support progressive taxation, several strong arguments
exist in its favor. First, the economic cost of benefits received should not
be the sole measure of benefit. 24 The intangible well-being represented
by economic and social stability are perhaps most valuable to the
wealthy. Second, the poor undoubtedly fare relatively better (i.e. re-
ceive disproportionately high benefits) even under a proportional system
of taxation because welfare benefits likely far outweigh tax liability.256 No
one suggests dismantling the tax system because legislatures are improp-
erly altruistic. Finally, government services and benefits tend to be better
in wealthier neighborhoods. 257 The rich are better off. It matters little that
an exact relationship between benefits and pain is difficult to discern if
benefits increase at an increasing rate with income.
Massey's assault on sacrifice theory also takes aim at the difficulty of
measurement. Just as benefits theory cannot calculate the exact benefit
each taxpayer receives, sacrifice theory cannot put a numerical value on a
person's sacrifice. 2 9 Professor Bittker, a supporter of progressive taxa-
tion, also recognized the deficiency: "[I]f these ideas are relentlessly sub-
jected to rigorous analysis, they have shortcomings.... [W]e cannot
know-other than by intuition-whether [taxpayers'] 'sacrifices' are
equal.''260 However, for Bittker, this criticism should not strengthen the
case for proportional or "flat" taxation. 26' The failure to quantify sacrifice
also means that no one can disprove sacrifice theory. In the debate be-
tween progressive taxation and proportional taxation, the ambiguity of
sacrifice theory would only support proportional taxation if it were enti-
tled to a presumption of fairness. As Bittker recognizes, that would be in-
262
appropriate.
253. See Slemrod, supra note 245, at 2.
254. Kornhauser, supra note 42, at 492.
255. See id. at 493; Bittker, supra note 44, at 240.
256. Kornhauser, supra note 42, at 492 n.98.
257. See id. at 494.
258. See id. at 495; Bittker, supra note 44, at 243.
259. See Massey, supra note 17, at 108. "[Ijt is by no means certain that money has declining
utility. Those who make the claim are far more likely to have an income of $50,000 than an in-
come of $10 million." Id. at 109.
260. Bittker, supra note 44, at 234.
261. See id. at 235.
262. See id.
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B. Pragmatism
Notwithstanding the foregoing, my judgment is that neither the philo-
sophical underpinnings of benefits theory nor sacrifice theory matter.
This is not to say that the inquiry is not a useful one; rather both must
263yield to pragmatism. Two points will illustrate what I mean.
First, the current income tax, with its system of deductions, exemp-
tions, and credits, undercuts the possibility of ever establishing a constitu-
tional norm of taxation that yields perfect equality.2 64 The moral war over
the fairest method of taxation cannot be fought on a constitutional battle-
field. Perhaps nothing more needs to be said.
The primary difficulty in characterizing progressive taxation as a tak-
ing is that there is no benchmark by which to measure what is permissible
within the sovereign's power to tax and what is proscribed as unconstitu-
tional under the Massey model. If one cannot prove that proportional
taxation is the preferred constitutional norm of taxation, then one has no
ground from which to attack progressive taxation. Even the Kemp Com-
mission, which studied and then advocated a flat system of taxation, de-
clined to set an optimal rate of flat taxation.265
Although Calvin Massey describes the impermissible taking aspect of
progressive taxation in terms of what is "disproportionate," in reality a
determination of "proportionality" is an impossible task. One might at-
tempt an estimate of the ideal rate by accounting for income earning lev-
els and projected government expenditures, but it is obvious that the
amount of expenditures government might make is open to some fluctua-
tion. If one cannot define the constitutional norm of taxation, then one
necessarily is left at sea in terms of defining unconstitutional deviations
266from the norm.
Massey implicitly accepts this objection by recognizing that a flat rate
would apply only above a certain threshold income. 267 To be fair, he ar-
gues that a system of taxation should exempt that amount of income re-
quired to supply necessities. While his policy reasoning is sound, al-
263. What follows is not so much a defense of progressive taxation as it is a defense of the
government's power to tax progressively.
264. See generally Louis Kaplow, Horizontal Equity: Measures in Search of a Principle, 42
NAT'L TAX J. 139 (1989) (discussing the inherent difficulties of identifying normative bases for
measuring horizontal equity).
265. See William G. Gale, The Kemp Commission and the Future of Tax Reform, 70 TAX
NOTES 717, 718 (1996).
266. See Bittker, supra note 44, at 234-35.
267. The flat tax advanced by Republican presidential hopeful Steve Forbes in 1996 also
contained this same kind of tax exclusion. See Gale, supra note 265, at 722.
268. This is really a variation of the idea that even the taxing sovereign cannot obtain blood
from taxpaying turnips. It is a feature of the flat tax proposals. See HALL ET AL., FAIRNESS AND
EFFICIENCY IN THE FLAT TAX 4 (1996) observing:
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lowing an exemption necessarily perverts the doctrinally pure concept of
proportional taxation.269
Just as Massey takes issue with a progressive system, a proportional
tax is subject to many of the same criticisms. As Professor Bittker once
observed, "proportionality is no more entitled to a presumption of fair-
,,2170ness than progression ....
There is no irreproachable reason why differential income justifies
differential tax payments, even if rates are the same for all. One might
make a case for a so-called "head tax" in which each person pays exactly
the same tax. A requirement that each living person pay a fixed amount
of tax might be the essence of fairness inasmuch as each person would be
taxed identically without regard to station in life.27' Only with such a sys-
tem, the mantra would go, could we be free to excel (if excellence is
measured in income) without being held back by the effects of taxation.
Once a taxpayer has met the amount of the head tax, each additional
dollar should be free of any claim by the fisc.
Massey notes that nobody advocates such a tax because, among other
reasons, it is quite regressive.2 I agree. To be doctrinally pure, however,
whenever a tax deviates from the constitutional norm, whether labeled
progressive or regressive, it should be unconstitutional under the Massey
approach. His difficulty is that any system of taxation is subject to the
same logical attack.273 It is perhaps no accident that the Constitution only
requires "just" compensation, not "equal" or "proportional" compensa-
tion. In the end, Calvin Massey's suggestion that progressive taxation can
be a "taking" is insupportable because it is antithetical to the sovereign
power to tax as a basic matter of policy.
Second, equity is influenced by other considerations. The existence of
deductions, exemptions, and credits illustrates the point. Disparities be-
Although sales and value-added taxes generally are a form of consumption tax, we re-
ject them for their lack of progressivity. The current federal tax system avoids taxing
the poor, and we think it should stay that way. Exempting the poor from taxes does not
require graduated tax rates rising to high levels for upper-income taxpayers. A flat rate,
applied to all income above a generous personal allowance would provide progressivity
without creating important differences in tax rates.
269. Massey explicitly recognizes this aspect of his system. See Massey, supra note 17, at 87;
see also O'Kelley, supra note 46, at 728 (1985) (arguing that introducing exemptions into a flat
tax makes it progressive).
270. Bittker, supra note 44, at 233.
271. For a more in-depth discussion of this concept, see Joseph Bankman & Thomas
Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Structure: A New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L.
REV. 1905, 1913 (1987).
272. Massey, supra note 17, at 87; see also Joel Slemrod, Do We Know How Progressive the
Income Tax System Should Be?, 36 NAT'L TAX J. 361, 363 (1983) (theorizing about, but not ad-
vocating, zero marginal tax rates for high-income taxpayers).
273. See, e.g., Bittker, supra note 44, at 233-34 ("In short, the case for every tax base and
every rate schedule is 'uneasy' ....").
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tween equal income earners are acceptable if there is a legitimate reason
to treat them differently.2 74 Criteria such as how many persons are de-
pendent upon the taxpayer's income can affect a taxpayer's liability. The
Court has made clear that "[t]he right to make exemptions is involved in
the right to select the subjects of taxation, and apportion the public bur-
dens among them .... ,275
Long ago, Professor Surrey illustrated the inequitable effect of tax in-
centives by using the example of the mortgage interest deduction. 276 If
one owns a house with a mortgage, the interest paid is deductible.277 Pro-
fessor Surrey observed that if one chooses to rent, then the tax savings
subsidy available to homeowners is not forthcoming.2 78 Homeowners are
favored at the expense of renters. Many might argue that the government
should favor homeowners because it is good policy to promote the in-
vestment and the stability that home ownership represents.
There are other instances where treating people unequally might be
better policy. For example, the altruistic are favored over the parsimoni-
ous by the charitable deduction. Those who put property to productive
use generate a cost recovery deduction under the Accelerated Cost Re-
covery system.2 79 Resort, under an income tax system, to various deduc-
tions and credits, necessarily results in disproportionality. Any income
tax system which contemplates a system of deductions or credits neces-
sarily contemplates different rates of taxation. To suggest that any tax
system could be perfectly proportional, however attractive the proposi-
tion, is to suggest a system unworkable in the world in which we live.280
Richard Epstein also recognized this reality. He conceded that if re-
sort is made to a proportional or "flat" tax, then the definition of taxable
income reaches constitutional dimension.281 Epstein realized that deduc-
tions and credits have real progressivity effects. His response, however, is
274. "Equity requires adjusting.., differing capabilities while keeping the adjustment crite-
ria as free of special provisions and ambiguities as possible." BREAK & PECHMAN, supra note 27,
at 6.
275. Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Savings Bank, 170 U.S. 283, 299 (1898); see also Hackett,
supra note 8, at 436-38 (1916) (criticizing the class warfare aspects of progressive taxation).
276. Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A
Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REv. 705, 721 (1970).
277. See I.R.C. § 163 (1999).
278. See Surrey, supra note 276, at 720-25.
279. The principle of horizontal equity is also violated by preferential treatment of income
such as capital gains and interest on government obligations. See Hudson, supra note 27, at 3.
280. The point is that the government has the power to create deductions and preferences;
the mere existence of them does not matter. A second point is that regressive deductions, like
the mortgage interest deduction, tend to make progressive rate structures less progressive.
Before complaining that a progressive income tax is constitutionally suspect, critics should real-
ize that because of the system of deductions and credits, the rate structure may be less progres-
sive than it appears to be.
281. EPSTEIN, supra note 13, at 300-302.
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to except from constitutional question those deviations from a pure pro-
portional tax which "do not generate any systematic disproportionate
impact. 2 2 This advanced distinction is problematic. If a taxpayer can ar-
range her affairs so as to eliminate all or part of her tax liability, her deci-
sion is individually made. This individual action is irrelevant to the ques-
tion of whether the sovereign's taxing power is legitimate in the context
of a deduction or in the context of differential taxation. Epstein's position
logically cannot be maintained.283
My point, therefore, is that Calvin Massey's approach is untenable
because his takings arguments would require rejection of a flat tax as
well. The need for deductions and tax credits in the current tax system
makes the shift to a proportional tax system that Massey endorses totally
unfeasible.
C. Deference to Legislatures
The deference to Congress or to state legislatures in matters relating
to tax is a theme that echoes throughout the tax cases. 28' The Supreme
Court assumes that the democratic process will, at some point, intrude to
take the sting out of any rampant unfairness in taxation. 28 ' Accordingly,
the Supreme Court has declined to choose one scheme over another as a
constitutionally permissible norm. For example, in Container Corp. of
America v. Franchise Tax Board,286 the Court gave deference to Califor-
nia's unitary tax system notwithstanding the fact that it resulted in a
skewed tax base as compared with other, more traditional, methods of
tax base determination. 2s 8The Court has expressly declined to adopt, as a
constitutional standard, any single method of taxation, choosing instead
to leave that choice to the Congress or state legislatures.
There is a practical reason for this approach. First, it eliminates the
need to decide what is fair in taxation. Second, the democratic process
provides a safety valve. As the Court in Nordlinger explained, no matter
282. Id. at 300.
283. An interesting question to ask under the Epstein formula is whether a proportional in-
come tax with a generous earned income credit would be constitutional. While nominally pro-
portional or "flat," such a scheme could make the system highly progressive. Would such a sys-
tem generate systematic disproportionate impact?
284. See, e.g., Providence Bank v. Billings, 29 U.S. 514, 563 (1830).
285. See, e.g., Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979). Chief Justice Marshall expressed the
same thought in 1830. See Billings, 29 U.S. at 563.
286. 463 U.S. 159 (1983).
287. See id. at 169-70 (citing Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Blair, 437 U.S. 267, 272 (1978)).
288. See, e.g., Trinova Corp. v. Michigan Dep't of Treasury, 498 U.S. 358, 386 (1991); Alle-
gheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm'n, 488 U.S. 336, 341-42 (1989); Container Corp. of
America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 169-70 (1983); Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Blair, 437 U.S.
267, 272 (1978).
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how unfair the tax system might be, the Court has faith that the demo-
cratic system will rectify unfairness. 9
The approach is also harmonious with Alexander Hamilton's frame-
work for raising revenue in the new republic. Concerned about the na-
tion's need to raise a defense and secure loans, Hamilton was convinced
that extensive restrictions should not bind the nation's ability to raise
revenue.29 He concluded:
As the duties of superintending the national defence, and of securing the
public peace against foreign or domestic violence, involve a provision for
casualties and dangers, to which no possible limits can be assigned, the power
of making that provision ought to know no other bounds than the exigencies
of the nation ....291
Accordingly, "the federal government must of necessity be invested with
an unqualified power of taxation in the ordinary modes. ' ,292 Given that
Hamilton was eyewitness to the failure of the Confederation, his prefer-
ence for a powerful central government was understandable.
Thus, case law defers to legislative discretion the appropriate alloca-
tion of the tax burden.293 The Court in Loan Ass'n v. Topeka294 supported
an unrestrained power to tax for public purposes because "in most in-
stances for which taxes are levied, as the support of government, the
prosecution of war, the National defence, any limitation is unsafe. The
entire resources of the people should in some instances be at the disposal
of the government."'2 95 The same logic applied to Knowlton, where the
progressivity of the estate tax was upheld with the observation that "it
transgresses no express limitation in the Constitution.,
296
289. See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 17 (1992) ("[T]he Constitution presumes that, ab-
sent some reason to infer antipathy, even improvident decisions will eventually be rectified by
the democratic process and that judicial intervention is generally unwarranted no matter how
unwisely we might think a political branch has acted." (quoting Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97
(1979))).
290. See THE FEDERALIST No. 30, (Alexander Hamilton) (Max Beloff ed., 1987).
291. THE FEDERALIST No. 31, at 148 (Alexander Hamilton) (Max Beloff ed., 1987).
292. Id. at 149. An indicator of the strength of Hamilton's conviction can be found in his dis-
cussion of poll taxes. Despite his distaste for such taxes, he did not want to strip the government
of that option. "As little friendly as I am to this species of imposition, I still feel a thorough con-
viction, that the power of having recourse to it, ought to exist in the federal government." THE
FEDERALIST No. 36, at 174 (Alexander Hamilton) (Max Beloff ed., 1987).
293. See, e.g., Dane v. Jackson, 256 U.S. 589, 599 (1921) ("[T]he only security of the citizen
[regarding taxation] must be found in the structure of our Government itself."); Knowlton v.
Moore, 178 U.S. 41, 109 (1900) ("[Slome authoritative thinkers.., contend that a progressive
tax is more just and equal than a proportional one. In the absence of constitutional limitation,
the question whether it is or is not is legislative and not judicial."); Tappan v. Merchants' Nat'l
Bank, 86 U.S. 490, 502 (1873) ("[T]he whole machinery of taxation must be contrived and put
into operation by the legislative department of the government.").
294. 87 U.S. 655 (1874).
295. Id. at 663.
296. Knowlton, 178 U.S. at 109.
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As the Court stated long ago, "the United States... cannot be held
liable for.., its public and general acts as a sovereign. 2 97 So long as the
Court finds that the government imposed the tax to perform essential
government services or to fulfill a necessary government function, the
Court can justify upholding the tax as necessary despite any unfair or dis-
criminatory effects. The Court's high standard can "be used to validate
any action by a [government] that is not demonstrably lunatic.
2 98
Preserving sovereign taxation powers does result in some apparent
unfair advantage for the government, but this must be balanced against
the obvious need for the government to function. The panoply of cases
discussed in the previous Part recognizes that sometimes even similarly
situated taxpayers can be treated differently. It requires little effort, then,
to conclude that .dissimilarly situated taxpayers, i.e. those with dissimilar
incomes, can be taxed differently as well.299
V. CONCLUSION
Modern jurisprudence views with skepticism the broad applicability of
the Constitution as a limitation upon the legislative power to tax. Calvin
Massey's blend of equal protection with takings jurisprudence might
comport with the Supreme Court's stance in protecting equality among
groups of taxpayers in similar circumstances. The Court acts quickly to
denounce a tax when the tax has the effect of creating horizontal inequi-
ties. However, vertical inequities among different economic groups, such
as those inherent in progressive tax schemes, have not received the same
treatment.
It might be tempting to view the government's exercise of its inherent
power to tax as a fundamentally unfair attempt to capture that which is
otherwise constitutionally proscribed by the Fifth Amendment. As a
practical matter, however, apart from the legal niceties, the power to tax
must be upheld. The sovereign should not be challenged when it uses its
constitutionally enumerated power to tax, unless such use is clearly im-
297. Horowitz v. United States, 267 U.S. 458, 461 (1925) (holding that the government can
impede the performance of its own contracts by sovereign acts).
298. Walter Guzzardi, Jr., What the Supreme Court Is Really Telling Business, FORTUNE,
Jan. 1977, at 146, 149. Considering the wide latitude the Court grants the taxing officials in its
recent Nordlinger, Carlton, and Barclays decisions, as well as the assertion that the Court defers
to the sovereign's exercise of "experimental" taxation powers, one may wonder just how far the
sovereign may go in imposing taxes before reaching the threshold of harsh and oppressive. See
generally Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298 (1994); United States v. Carlton,
512 U.S. 26 (1994); Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1 (1992).
299. This comes remarkably close to stating that there is no constitutional requirement of
fairness. Nonetheless, there can be no fine distinction between a tax and a taking because the
sovereign's options are then too restricted.
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proper. The Court protects the government's power to tax by setting ex-
tremely high thresholds for striking a tax as unconstitutional and by nar-
rowly construing any claims that its power of taxation is limited in any
significant way.
For the most part, the government is given free rein to act as a sover-
eign when exercising its sovereign powers. In matters of taxation, as
Steinbeck's Muley Graves eloquently stated, we "ain't got no choice. '
300. See supra note 1.
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